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Foreign Governments as Plaintiffs in
U.S. Courts and the Case Against
“Judicial Imperialism”
Hannah L. Buxbaum *
Abstract
One consequence of the increasingly transnational nature of
civil litigation is that U.S. courts must frequently address the
interests of foreign sovereigns. These interactions arise primarily
in three contexts: when a foreign government is the defendant in a
U.S. court; when a claim requires a U.S. court to scrutinize
actions taken by a foreign government; and when a U.S. court
seeks to apply U.S. law to persons or conduct within a foreign
government’s borders. Each of these contexts invokes a narrative
in which the engagement of U.S. courts interferes or conflicts with
the prerogatives of a foreign sovereign. As a result, we typically
consider the foreign relations implications of domestic
adjudication within a paradigm that is oriented toward
constraining the engagement of U.S. courts in matters involving
foreign sovereign interests. What this approach ignores, however,
is that foreign sovereigns are also plaintiffs in U.S. courts. A full
account of the interactions between U.S. courts and foreign
sovereigns must address cases in which foreign governments
actively seek to engage U.S. judicial resources.
This Article sets out the first systematic analysis of claims
filed in U.S. domestic courts by foreign sovereigns, drawing on an
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examination of almost 300 claims. It establishes a basic typology
of such claims, and then uses three case studies to explore and
challenge the paradigm outlined above. The final section of the
article relies on the results of this examination to analyze
developments in one particular context: the extraterritorial
application of U.S. law. It argues that the narrative of “judicial
imperialism” that has come to frame discussion in that area is
neither accurate nor useful.
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I. Introduction
Civil litigation in the United States has become increasingly
transnational, and U.S. courts routinely consider claims that
involve foreign parties, significant foreign elements, or both. One
particular aspect of this transnationalization is that domestic
courts must frequently address the interests of foreign
sovereigns. Foreign governments are sometimes parties to
litigation in U.S. courts; in addition, they often participate as
amici curiae in litigation involving their citizens (including
corporations formed under their laws). These interactions create
a range of implications for U.S. foreign relations.
Interactions between U.S. domestic courts and foreign
sovereigns arise primarily in three contexts: (1) when a foreign
government is the defendant in a U.S. court, raising the issue of
sovereign immunity; 1 (2) when a claim requires a U.S. court to
scrutinize actions taken by a foreign government within its own
borders, raising the act of state issue; 2 and (3) when a U.S. court
seeks to apply U.S. law to persons or conduct within a foreign
government’s borders, raising the issue of extraterritoriality. 3
1. The scope and limits of sovereign immunity are set forth in the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1611 (2012).
2. See generally Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)
(discussing the act of state doctrine and its rationale).
3. For a comprehensive introduction, see William S. Dodge,
Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 85, 85–87 (1998) (tracing the jurisprudence of the presumption from
Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909), to Hartford Fire Ins.
Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993)). The Supreme Court’s most recent
jurisprudence on the extraterritorial application of U.S. law is discussed infra
Part IV.C.
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Each of these contexts invokes a narrative in which the
involvement of U.S. courts creates conflict—or potential conflict—
with the interests of foreign governments, which in turn seek to
fend off the intervention of U.S. courts to preserve their own
sovereign autonomy. The paradigm within which we consider the
foreign relations implications of domestic adjudication is in this
sense oriented toward constraining the engagement of U.S. courts
in matters involving foreign sovereign interests.
But what about situations in which foreign governments
actively seek the engagement of U.S. courts? They often do—
because they are not only defendants in our courts, but also
plaintiffs. When foreign sovereigns initiate lawsuits in U.S.
courts, they choose to engage with our judicial system, and to
deploy the resources of that system to attain certain objectives.
An examination of such lawsuits can therefore yield a fuller
account of the interactions between foreign governments and U.S.
courts, permitting us to test the adequacy of the prevailing
paradigm and consider its normative implications.
This Article sets out the first systematic analysis of claims
filed in U.S. domestic courts by foreign governments, drawing on
an examination of almost 300 claims lodged by foreign sovereigns
in U.S. courts. 4 Part II begins with a brief review of the standing
of foreign sovereigns to sue in U.S. courts. It then establishes a
typology of claims initiated by foreign governments, ranging from
ordinary commercial claims to claims arising from alleged treaty
violations by the United States. Part III focuses on one subset of
these claims, using a series of case studies to investigate more
closely the foreign policy implications of U.S. judicial engagement
in matters involving foreign sovereigns. It analyzes those claims
from the perspective of both the plaintiffs (examining their
arguments for initiating litigation in the United States) and the
courts (examining the analysis they deploy to assess various
jurisdictional limits). This analysis complicates the traditional
account of these implications in several important ways. First, it
reveals regional differences in the motivation of governments to
file certain types of claims, suggesting that further differentiation
is required in analyzing the impact of U.S. judicial intervention
4. See infra notes 46–47 and accompanying text (describing the
methodology used in assembling this data set).
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on foreign interests. Second, it undermines some of the
arguments that foreign governments make as amici curiae when
they object to the assertion of U.S. jurisdiction in cases involving
their citizens. Third, and most broadly, it challenges the
characterization of judicial intervention as unwelcome
unilateralism—a characterization that shapes much of the
discussion regarding U.S. judicial engagement in international
matters.
Part IV uses the results of this examination to analyze
developments in one particular context: the extraterritorial
application of U.S. law. In a series of recent decisions, the
Supreme Court has restricted both the extraterritorial
application of domestic regulatory law 5 and the scope of
jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute6—changes that were
intended to and will limit the role of U.S. courts in adjudicating
transnational disputes. This retrenchment reflects the
ascendance of one particular narrative focused on the foreign
policy implications of transnational litigation: a narrative in
which the engagement of U.S. courts in the global arena
constitutes interference with the sovereign authority of other
countries. At its center is the argument that U.S. courts
undermine the regulatory authority of other nations when they
overreach by (a) taking jurisdiction over claims that are more
closely connected to other countries and presumably should be
litigated there, and (b) too readily applying U.S. law to claims
with significant foreign elements. The narrative is not entirely
new: Its basic contours can be traced in past episodes of judicial
engagement in the transnational arena, such as the international
antitrust disputes of the 1970s. 7 Its dominance today, however, is
5. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 278 (2010)
(applying the presumption against extraterritoriality to securities law); F.
Hoffmann–LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 158 (2004)
(interpreting domestic antitrust law to exclude foreign activity causing foreign
harm).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); see Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133
S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (holding that the Alien Tort Statute was not meant to
have extraterritorial reach).
7. For a discussion of this litigation and the resulting conflict between the
United States and other countries, see ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL
LITIGATION AND THE QUEST FOR REASONABLENESS: ESSAYS IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 157–66 (1996) (analyzing the interplay between U.S. and
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new. In addition, it has become far more pointed, often finding
expression in cases and commentary as “judicial imperialism.”
Litigants routinely invoke this narrative in contesting the
exercise of legislative jurisdiction by U.S. courts. 8 Foreign
governments use it to frame their complaints about the perceived
overreaching of U.S. courts, arguing the need for judicial
restraint in various contexts. 9 It has become prominent in legal
scholarship, as commentators invoke it to support normative
arguments regarding the role of domestic courts in transnational
disputes. Most consequentially, U.S. courts, including the
Supreme Court, have increasingly cited concerns regarding
interference with foreign sovereignty as a primary rationale for
limiting legislative jurisdiction over transnational claims. The
rhetoric of imperialism is in this way translating into a reduced
role for U.S. courts in addressing transnational regulatory
cases—a change that will have significant impact on overall
enforcement capacity.
Judicial imperialism is a powerful and effective narrative for
the reasons explored below. The analysis of claims initiated by
foreign sovereigns, however, suggests that the concept fails to
capture the full range of interactions between foreign
governments and U.S. courts. Many of these interactions indicate
the possibility that U.S. judicial engagement creates conditions
not only of conflict but also of coordination within the system of
global governance. The Article concludes that the imperialism
narrative is neither accurate nor useful; it impedes doctrinal
development in the area of extraterritoriality, and misdirects
institutional design choices in global governance.
British courts in litigation involving a uranium cartel).
8. Infra Part IV.
9. In one of the Alien Tort Statute cases that reached the U.S. Supreme
Court, for instance, the European Commission filed an amicus brief stating:
[I]n order to respect the authority of States and organizations, like
the European Community, exercising their authority to regulate
activities occurring on their own territory, and hence to preserve
harmonious international relations, States must respect the limits
imposed by international law on the authority of any individual State
to apply its laws beyond its own territory.
Brief of the European Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither
Party at 2, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339), 2004 WL
177036.
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II. Foreign Governments as Plaintiffs in U.S. Courts
As noted above, the interactions between U.S. courts and
foreign governments are typically considered in connection with
cases in which those governments resist the involvement of the
U.S. judiciary in cases that implicate their interests. 10 However,
this paradigm, in which foreign governments adopt a defensive
posture regarding U.S. judicial involvement, does not capture the
full range of those interactions. For instance, sometimes foreign
governments waive their immunity to suit in U.S. court. 11
Sometimes they express support for the adjudication in the
United States of claims involving their citizens or their own
interests. 12 And sometimes, of course, they are plaintiffs in U.S.
courts. In these cases, they take affirmative action to initiate the
involvement of U.S. courts in resolving transnational disputes.
Although such claims constitute a small percentage of all
litigation involving foreign sovereign parties, they provide a
critical counterpoint to the prevailing paradigm. A full account of
the foreign relations issues arising from judicial engagement in
the transnational arena must therefore consider such litigation.
This Part analyzes the results of research on claims initiated
in U.S. domestic courts by foreign governments. It begins with an
overview of the law governing the standing of foreign
governments to sue in U.S. courts, and then establishes a
typology of the lawsuits they initiate.

10. Supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
11. See Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2256
(2014) (“A foreign state may waive jurisdictional immunity, § 1605(a)(1), and in
this case Argentina did so.”).
12. One mechanism that some countries have employed to steer litigation
involving their citizens towards U.S. courts is the “anti-forum non conveniens”
statute. These laws are designed to close local courts to claims that were
dismissed by a foreign court on the basis of forum non conveniens, thus
eliminating the possibility of an adequate alternative forum. See generally
Ronald A. Brand, Challenges to Forum Non Conveniens, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 1003, 1017–21 (2013).
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A. The Standing of Foreign Governments to Sue in U.S. Courts
As the Supreme Court has long confirmed, foreign
governments have standing to bring suit in U.S. courts. 13 The
source of their standing is the general principle of comity—that
is, the goodwill and respect that sovereign states afford one
another. 14 As a result, their standing is viewed as a privilege, not
as a right, and is limited to “recognized” foreign governments not
at war with the United States. 15 The authority to recognize a
foreign government rests solely with the executive; thus, once a
government has officially been recognized, the courts must afford
it standing to sue. 16
In a number of cases, U.S. courts have confronted claims
brought by governments in the midst of diplomatic unrest with
the United States—including some brought by governments with
which the U.S. had broken off diplomatic relations entirely. 17 As
some commentators have argued, if comity is the source of their
standing, then it would be more appropriate for courts to inspect
not just the past act of the executive in recognizing a government,
but the current policies and activities of that government. 18 On
13. In Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, the Supreme Court confirmed the
rule “that a foreign nation is generally entitled to prosecute any civil claim in
the courts of the United States upon the same basis as a domestic corporation or
individual might do.” 434 U.S. 308, 318–19 (1978).
14. Early cases speak of “comity and friendly feeling” among sovereigns as
the basis for according this privilege. See The Sapphire, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 164,
167 (1881) (“A foreign sovereign, as well as any other foreign person, who has a
demand of a civil nature against any person here, may prosecute it in our
courts. To deny him this privilege would manifest a want of comity and friendly
feeling.”); see also Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 323 (1934)
(explaining that this entitlement is a privilege resulting from comity).
15. See Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 319–20 (“It has long been established that only
governments recognized by the United States and at peace with us are entitled
to access to our courts . . . .”).
16. See generally Lori Fisler Damrosch, Foreign States and the
Constitution, 73 VA. L. REV. 483, 523–24 (1987) (describing the “absolute
deference” accorded to the executive in making this determination).
17. See Republic of Cuba v. Mayan Lines, S.A., 145 So. 2d 679, 682 (La. Ct.
App. 1962) (allowing Cuba to bring a suit in United States courts despite “the
complete severance of [a] relationship between the Government of the United
States and the Government of Cuba”).
18. See J. Gordon Hansen, Current Problems Regarding the Standing of
Foreign Governments to Sue in American Courts, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 417, 419
(1964) (arguing that “recognition of a government by the United States at some
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such a view, a disruption in diplomatic relations would eliminate
the need to afford the relevant government courtesy and goodwill,
and would therefore strip it of its standing to sue in U.S. courts. 19
The cases, however, have been uniform in concluding that it is
formal recognition alone that is the predicate to standing. 20 In
one case, for instance, a Louisiana court held that recognition
continues until “expressly withdrawn . . . by the appropriate
political department” and that the court would therefore not
consider the fact of diplomatic unrest (in that case, with Cuba). 21
The Supreme Court ratified this view in Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino. 22
As the Pfizer case cited above states, foreign governments
have the right to sue “upon the same basis as a domestic
corporation or individual.” 23 As a result, their claims must meet
all of the generally applicable requirements for standing in U.S.
courts. Under the prevailing framework for standing in federal
courts, this means that foreign government plaintiffs must allege:
(1) injury in fact (actual harm to a legally protected interest),
(2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged
conduct, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision. 24 Additionally, they must ensure that their
past time does not show present comity between the two nations”).
19. See id. at 432 (“Therefore, if lack of recognition indicates a lack of
comity, a severance of diplomatic relations indicates this same condition, and
the same result should ensue.”).
20. See, e.g., Nat’l Petrochem. Co. of Iran v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551,
554 (2d Cir. 1988) (explaining that disruption in diplomatic relations with Iran
did not impair standing of that government to sue in U.S. federal courts).
21. Republic of Cuba, 145 So. 2d at 683.
22. See 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964):
This Court would hardly be competent to undertake assessments of
varying degrees of friendliness or its absence, and, lacking some
definite touchstone for determination, we are constrained to consider
any relationship, short of war, with a recognized sovereign power as
embracing the privilege of resorting to United States courts.
23. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 308 (1978).
24. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (setting
forth the test for standing in federal court). The federal judicial power extends
to “all Cases . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Under the statute
governing diversity jurisdiction, the federal courts have jurisdiction over claims
between foreign sovereigns and entities within the United States. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)(4) (2012).
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claims do not run afoul of one of the judicially created limitations
on standing, such as the prohibition on third-party standing. 25 As
these criteria suggest, the standing requirements are most likely
to be satisfied when the foreign government asserts harm to an
ordinary proprietary interest of some kind (for instance, in a
breach of contract action against a U.S. supplier), or to its own
sovereign interest. They are less likely to be satisfied when the
government, in one way or another, asserts an interest on behalf
of individual citizens or its populace as a whole.
Indeed, the most significant issue that has arisen in this
context is whether foreign governments enjoy parens patriae
standing, an exception to normal standing requirements that
permits certain governments to bring suit on behalf of their
citizens. This exception developed in the common law over the
course of the twentieth century, primarily in the context of one
state suing another to enjoin activity that was harming the
former’s citizens. In one leading case, Missouri sued to enjoin
Illinois from dumping sewage into interstate waters; the Supreme
Court held that a state had standing to sue to protect “the health
and comfort of [its] inhabitants,” even where it did not assert
harm to an independent interest of its own. 26 In certain
substantive areas, the authority to initiate claims protecting
these sorts of “quasi-sovereign” interests was incorporated into
statutory law. Under the Clayton Act, for instance, state
attorneys general are empowered to bring suit under antitrust
laws in the interest of their citizens; 27 similarly, many states
25. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61.
26. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901). Cases of this sort also
articulated a clear limitation: states were not permitted to sue as simply
“nominal” parties where in fact the action was initiated for the benefit of
particular individuals. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 665–
66 (1976) (“[A] state has standing to sue only when its sovereign or
quasi-sovereign interests are implicated and it is not merely litigating as a
volunteer the personal claims of its citizens . . . .”). In certain circumstances,
however, government officials (such as consular officials) have been permitted to
bring suit on behalf of individual citizens—for instance, in prize cases, or cases
in which an individual sought restitution of particular property located within
the United States.
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(c) (2012) (providing in part that “any attorney
general of a State may bring a civil action in the name of such State, as parens
patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in such State . . . to secure
monetary relief as provided in this section for injury sustained by such natural
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have enacted consumer protection statutes that expressly confer
parens patriae authority on their attorneys general. 28
In 1982, the Supreme Court revisited the parens patriae
jurisprudence and issued a decision that has become the leading
modern articulation of the doctrine. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc.
v. Puerto Rico 29 involved claims that a number of Virginia
companies had discriminated against temporary workers from
Puerto Rico. 30 The Court summarized the doctrine as follows:
In order to maintain [a parens patriae] action, the State
must . . . express a quasi-sovereign interest. Although the
articulation of such interests is a matter for case-by-case
development—neither an exhaustive formal definition nor a
definitive list of qualifying interests can be presented in the
abstract—certain characteristics of such interests are so far
evident. These characteristics fall into two general categories.
First, a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and
well-being—both physical and economic—of its residents in
general. Second, a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in not
being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the
federal system. 31

Snapp of course involved the rights of U.S. state
governments, 32 and it is in that context that the second category
persons”).
28. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 19-86-080 (West 2015) (“The attorney
general may bring an action . . . as parens patriae on behalf of persons residing
in the state against any person to restrain and prevent the doing of any act
herein prohibited or declared to be unlawful . . . .”).
29. 458 U.S. 592 (1982).
30. See id. at 597–98 (“[T]he complaint alleged that the defendants had
violated . . . federal regulations . . . by failing to provide employment for
qualified Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers, by [providing] working conditions
more burdensome than those established for temporary foreign workers, and by
improperly terminating [their] employment . . . .”).
31. Id. at 608. The Court also classified various forms of interests that fell
outside the parameters of the doctrine, including “proprietary” interests and
interests pursued by the state as a merely nominal party on behalf of a real
party in interest. Id. at 601; see also Richard P. Ieyoub & Theodore Eisenberg,
State Attorney General Actions, the Tobacco Litigation, and the Doctrine of
Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1859, 1863–69 (2000) (discussing the scope of
interests protected by the parens patriae doctrine).
32. As a Commonwealth of the United States, Puerto Rico was subject to
the same treatment as a state. See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 608 n.15 (“Although we
have spoken throughout of a ‘State’s’ standing as parens patriae, we
agree . . . that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is similarly situated to a
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of interests it identifies is relevant. As previous cases
emphasized, part of the logic for permitting states to sue on
behalf of their citizens is that they have forfeited other avenues of
redress by becoming part of a federal system. In Missouri v.
Illinois, 33 the Court stated:
If Missouri were an independent and sovereign state all must
admit that she could seek a remedy by negotiation, and, that
failing, by force. Diplomatic powers and the right to make war
having been surrendered to the general government, it was to
expected that upon the latter would be devolved the duty of
providing a remedy . . . . 34

Foreign governments, in contrast, retain the ability to assert
their interests via diplomatic channels and, ultimately, by waging
war. 35 The “federalism” justification for parens patriae standing
therefore does not apply to them. The Snapp decision, however,
appears to present the two categories of quasi-sovereign interests
as alternative bases for standing, in which case foreign
governments might enjoy the right to bring claims in a parens
patriae capacity on the other basis—to defend the health or
economic interests of their citizens. 36
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the
question of parens patriae suits by foreign governments, a
number of lower federal courts have. In the leading case on the
issue, Estado Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 37 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit declined to extend that doctrine to
foreign governments. 38 That case involved a claim by Mexico that
a Maine egg producer had violated the civil rights of workers of
Mexican descent (many of whom were Mexican citizens). 39 Mexico

State . . . . It has a claim to represent its quasi-sovereign interests in federal
court at least as strong as that of any State.”).
33. 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
34. Id. at 241.
35. Cf., e.g., Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 328–29 (1920)
(“Undoubtedly, the United States can declare war and it, not the states, has the
power to raise and maintain armies.”).
36. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
37. 229 F.3d 332 (1st Cir. 2000).
38. Id. at 339.
39. Id. at 334.
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therefore relied on the first of the two Snapp categories. 40
However, the court situated the entire analysis within the
context of the federalism question, stating that “such interests
are a critical element of parens patriae standing.” 41 It conceded
that “Snapp’s discussion of federalism principles . . . seems to
refer distinctly to the second of the two grounds of standing,” 42
but concluded nevertheless that the “primary justification” for
recognizing parens patriae standing in U.S. states “derives from
important principles underlying our federal system.” 43 Noting
that “[b]y definition, a foreign nation has no cognizable interests
in our system of federalism,” 44 it held that foreign governments
did not enjoy this form of standing in U.S. courts. The court
recognized as an exception the circumstance in which either the
Supreme Court or the political branches had indicated a clear
intent to permit such standing. 45
B. Typology of Claims Initiated by Foreign Governments
This Part turns to an investigation of the lawsuits that
foreign governments file in U.S. courts. It explores the wide
variety of contexts for such litigation, ranging from ordinary
commercial activity to allegations of treaty violations by the U.S.
government. It also reveals significant regional differences in the
arguments that foreign sovereigns make when seeking U.S.
judicial intervention. The goal of this examination is to provide a
rich context within which to consider the transnational
engagement of domestic courts, and to explore whether a
counter-narrative emerges to the vision of U.S. judicial activity as
40. See id. at 336 (discussing the Snapp court’s reasoning).
41. Id. at 339.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 337 (“First, the States have surrendered certain aspects of
their sovereignty to the federal government and, in return, are given recourse to
solve their problems with other States. . . . Second, States require a sufficiently
independent forum to resolve their disputes with one another.”).
44. Id. at 339.
45. See id. at 336 (“Our answer is that parens patriae standing should not
be recognized in a foreign nation unless there is a clear indication of intent to
grant such standing expressed by the Supreme Court or by the two coordinate
branches of government.”).
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interfering or conflicting with the prerogatives of foreign
sovereigns.
In conducting this study, I assembled as full a set as possible
of claims brought by foreign governments. They are drawn from
Westlaw’s “cases” and “trial court documents” databases, in order
to identify complaints as well as cases in which a decision was
issued. 46 Because these data are necessarily incomplete, 47 the
Article’s objective is not to make quantitative claims or draw
statistical inferences, but rather to analyze the results as a
cross-section of litigation initiated in U.S. courts by foreign
sovereign plaintiffs. While it examines judicial decisions relating
to these claims, the study’s primary goal is to analyze the
complaints themselves. It takes a functional approach, asking
what foreign governments seek when they sue in U.S. courts and
what different laws and procedures they wish to access.
Lawsuits by foreign governments fall principally into the
following broad categories:
1. Claims related to assets located within the territory of the
United States;
2. Requests for assistance in connection with foreign judicial
or arbitral proceedings;
3. Claims for monetary relief in connection with commercial
activity in the United States or involving U.S.
counterparties;
4. Claims for injunctive relief following alleged treaty
violations by a U.S. municipality or state, or by the federal
government; and

46. For each country recognized as a sovereign government by the United
States, I searched for instances in which the name of the country (including the
names of predecessor states) appeared in the caption of a case or complaint. I
then reviewed the results to ascertain whether the claim in question had been
initiated by the foreign government.
47. For example, Westlaw includes only reported decisions and
non-reported decisions that particular courts choose to submit for inclusion. See,
e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of
Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203, 1209 n.24 (2013) (citing studies
demonstrating that a data set drawn from that source is not necessarily
representative of all disputes).
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5. Claims for monetary relief for damages suffered in
connection with unlawful conduct occurring within the
foreign state. 48
This Part analyzes each of these categories, providing illustrative
examples of claims and assessing the U.S. judicial response to
them.
1. Claims Related to Assets Located Within the United States
In these cases, the logic for initiating litigation in a U.S.
court is clear: The U.S. court will have the ability to enforce a
successful judgment against the relevant assets. Many of them
are routine types of claims that raise no significant foreign affairs
problems; some, however, particularly those initiated following a
regime change, can raise foreign policy concerns. The routine
lawsuits within this category include maritime claims in which
foreign governments seek to recover a vessel located in U.S.
waters or damages for cargo losses occurring within U.S.
territory. 49 They also include claims to enforce judgments or
arbitral awards rendered in other jurisdictions, 50 as well as
claims made against the bankruptcy estate of a U.S. debtor. 51
48. For
a
typology
of
foreign-state
claims
asserted
within
Anglo-Commonwealth legal systems, focusing more on substantive fields of law,
see CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 434 (2015).
49. Many of the older cases in the data set fall into this category. Of the
claims initiated by major seafaring nations, for instance, a significant number
(including five claims initiated by Portugal in the 1820s, for example) sought to
recover either cargo or a vessel located within the United States. The Gran
Para, 20 U.S. 471 (1822); The Fanny, 22 U.S. 658 (1824); Chace v. Vasquez, 24
U.S. 429 (1826).
50. In these cases, the foreign government plaintiff is in the position of a
judgment creditor seeking to enforce that judgment against U.S. assets of the
defendant. See, e.g., Att’y Gen. of Barb. v. Fitzpatrick Const. Ltd., No. 87–4714,
1988 WL 18871, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 1988) (seeking to enforce a judgment of
the High Court of Barbados); Ministry of Def. of the Islamic Republic of Iran v.
Gould Inc., 887 F.2d 1357, 1358 (9th Cir. 1989) (seeking to enforce an
arbitration award of the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal).
51. In re Patterson–MacDonald Shipbuilding Co., 293 F. 192, 193 (9th Cir.
1923) (“The question presented by the record before us is this: If a foreign
government presents a claim to a trustee in bankruptcy arising out of contract
and prays for its liquidation . . . may the court of bankruptcy render judgment
against the foreign government for the ascertained balance?”); In re Dinter, Ch.
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Several lawsuits within this category involve cultural
heritage claims. In one case, Germany brought a claim against a
U.S. citizen to recover two Duerer paintings allegedly stolen
during the occupation of Weimar and ultimately acquired by the
defendant. 52 Other such cases include claims by Croatia,
Hungary, and Lebanon to recover a collection of Roman silver
pieces held for auction by Sotheby’s in New York; 53 a claim by the
Philippines to recover a Picasso painting allegedly stolen from the
government’s New York office; 54 claims by two successive
governments of Romania to recover artwork located in New
York; 55 a claim by Turkey to recover artifacts in the possession of
the Metropolitan Museum of Art; 56 and a complaint brought by
Peru against Yale University seeking the return of stolen
antiquities, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. 57
Many of the cases in this category arise following, and often
due to, changes in political regimes. Some seek the return of
specific assets that were allegedly improperly converted by
former heads of government and, at the time of litigation, were
located in the United States. Haiti, for example, filed a lawsuit
7 Case No. 93–3823, Adv. No. 92–1426, 1993 WL 484201, at *6 (D. N.J. Nov. 19,
1993) (discussing what claim Germany would have to the assets of a former
citizen of Germany who had moved to New York and declared bankruptcy).
52. Federal Republic of Germany v. Elicofon, 358 F. Supp. 747, 752–53
(E.D.N.Y. 1970).
53. See Republic of Lebanon v. Sotheby’s, 167 A.D.2d 142, 142–44 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1990) (examining two competing claims of ownership for the “Sevso
Treasure”); Republic of Croatia v. Tr. of the Marquess of Northampton 1987
Settlement, 203 A.D.2d 167, 167–68 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (discussing claims
against the same “Sevso Treasure,” this time between Croatia and Hungary).
54. Republic of the Philippines v. Christie’s, No. 98–3871, 2000 WL
1056300, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2000).
55. See State of Romania v. Former King Michael, 212 A.D.2d 422, 423
(N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (dismissing Romania’s suit to reclaim “its artistic
patrimony, which has allegedly been scattered throughout Europe and, for our
purposes, New York” because the issue was already being litigated in European
courts); Socialist Republic of Romania v. Wildenstein & Co., 147 F.R.D. 62, 63–
66 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (involving a claim relating to the same artwork initiated by a
predecessor regime).
56. Republic of Turkey v. Metro. Museum of Art, 762 F. Supp. 44, 46–47
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
57. See First Amended Complaint ¶ 2, Republic of Peru v. Yale Univ., No.
09CV01332, 2009 WL 6928272 (D. Conn. Apr. 20, 2009) (alleging that Yale
breached a contract with Peru by not returning certain artifacts).
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seeking damages for conversion, alleging that a particular yacht
had been purchased with funds improperly diverted from the
Haitian treasury by former president Jean-Claude Duvalier. 58 In
a similar case, the Republic of the Philippines sought an
injunction barring its former president Ferdinand Marcos, and a
number of others, from alienating their interests in certain
property in the state of New York alleged to have been purchased
with public funds. 59 Where these claims relate not merely to
assets located within the forum but to the disposition of assets
located outside the United States—or seek broader monetary
relief from former government officials—they raise more
complicated questions, addressed below. 60
Another set of claims following regime changes seek
injunctions that would prevent U.S. financial institutions from
transferring funds at the direction of an ousted official. For
instance, during the conflict in Panama between the Delvalle and
Noriega regimes, a number of claims were initiated by the
Delvalle government seeking to enjoin U.S. banks from
transferring assets at the direction of certain agencies or
instrumentalities within that country. 61 Similarly, following the
relocation of the National Government of the Republic of China to
Taipei in 1949, litigation ensued when the newly formed People’s
Republic of China sought to block the National Government’s
access to bank accounts in the United States. 62 As noted above,
58. See Republic of Haiti v. Crown Charters, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 839, 844
(S.D. Fla. 1987) (explaining that Haiti sought damages on three grounds: breach
of fiduciary duty to plaintiff, breach of fiduciary duty to Haiti, and “imposition of
a constructive trust”); see also Republic of Haiti v. Duvalier, 211 A.D.2d 379,
380–81 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (seeking to recover funds allegedly embezzled by
Michele Duvalier and her husband and deposited into a particular account in a
New York bank).
59. See Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 348 (2d Cir.
1986) (discussing the fact that “five properties in New York were allegedly
purchased for the benefit of the Marcoses from the proceeds of moneys and
assets stolen as stated above from the Philippine government”).
60. Infra Part III.A.3.
61. See, e.g., Republic of Panama v. Republic Nat’l Bank, 681 F. Supp.
1066, 1068–69 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (discussing Panama’s motion to enjoin funds held
in U.S. banks); Republic of Panama v. Citizens & S. Int’l Bank, 682 F. Supp.
1544, 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (entering “a preliminary injunction against the
defendants from making any debit, . . . against any account of the Republic of
Panama, as well as any agency or instrumentality thereof”).
62. See, e.g., Republic of China v. Am. Express Co., 195 F.2d 230, 231–32
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only a foreign government recognized by the U.S. executive has
standing to sue in U.S. courts. 63 In cases like these, the foreign
affairs concern is simply identifying which of two competing
claimants has the right to formal recognition. 64
2. Requests for Judicial Assistance
Of the set of claims examined, 20% fall into this category. In
most of the cases in this group, foreign governments simply avail
themselves of the rights they possess under bilateral treaties
with the United States. These include extradition treaties 65 and
treaties providing for mutual legal assistance in civil or criminal
matters. 66 Claims in the latter category include requests for
various forms of assistance, including the deposition of witnesses
located in the United States 67 and the provision of blood or DNA
testing in connection with paternity disputes. 68 Additional claims
for judicial assistance arise not under treaties but pursuant to 28
(2d Cir. 1952) (examining a claim by the Republic of China that American
Express refused to hand over money deposited by China).
63. Supra note 5 and accompanying text.
64. For an example of the complications that can result, see Government of
Rwanda v. Johnson, 409 F.3d 368, 376–77 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (addressing claims
brought against a former ambassador alleging conversion and breach of
fiduciary duty).
65. Twenty-seven of the claims analyzed were requests for extradition. In
such cases, the U.S. court simply reviews the request to ensure that the
procedural requirements established in the relevant treaty have been met. See,
e.g., Republic of France v. Moghadam, 617 F. Supp. 777, 778 (N.D. Cal. 1985)
(denying a request on the ground that France had failed to establish either the
existence of probable cause or the principle of dual criminality, two
requirements under the treaty between France and the United States).
66. Thirty-four claims were for assistance in civil or criminal matters
pending in the requesting country. In such cases, again, the U.S. court reviews
the request to ensure that it meets the conditions for assistance established in
the relevant treaty.
67. See, e.g., In re Request from Swiss Fed. Dept. of Justice & Police, 731 F.
Supp. 490, 490–91 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (discussing a request from the Swiss under
the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters).
68. See, e.g., In re Letter of Request from Dist. Court Stara Lubovna, No.
3:09–mc–20–34, 2009 WL 3711924, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2009) (allowing the
United States to collect DNA-based evidence on a request from the Slovak
Republic).
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U.S.C. § 1782, a provision that enables U.S. courts to render
judicial assistance to foreign authorities in connection with
proceedings underway in foreign tribunals. 69 Foreign
governments have sought assistance under this provision in
connection with both litigation and arbitration occurring
elsewhere, although the latter claims have been unsuccessful. 70
Finally, foreign governments sometimes seek various forms
of non-monetary relief in connection with ongoing proceedings in
other fora. For example, governments have sought to vacate or
modify arbitral awards rendered against them, 71 to stay
arbitration, 72 and to set aside judgments. 73
3. Claims for Monetary Relief in Connection with U.S.-Based
Commercial Activity
Foreign governments often participate in various forms of
commercial activity that is based in the United States or involves
U.S. counterparties. When they suffer losses as a result of such
activity, they may sue in U.S. courts to recover monetary
damages. 74 Many of the cases in this category are relatively
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2012). The section provides in part that “[t]he district
court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him to give
his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a
proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.” Id. § 1782(a). For a general
overview of the scope of the provision, see Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro
Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 247–49 (2004).
70. See, e.g., Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d 880, 883
(5th Cir. 1999) (declining to provide assistance and holding that § 1782 was not
intended to apply to private international arbitration).
71. See, e.g., Republic of Argentina v. BG Grp. PLC, 665 F.3d 1363, 1365
(D.C. Cir. 2012), rev’d by BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198,
1205 (2014) (seeking to vacate or modify arbitral award rendered pursuant to a
bilateral investment treaty); Republic of Colombia v. Cauca Co., 106 F. 337, 338
(D. W. Va. 1901), rev’d, 190 U.S. 524, 525 (1903) (seeking to cancel an award
made pursuant to agreement to arbitrate).
72. See, e.g., Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 376 F. Supp. 2d
334, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (petitioning a stay of arbitration on the grounds that
Ecuador never agreed to arbitrate).
73. See, e.g., Republic of Cuba v. Mayan Lines, S.A., 145 So.2d 679, 689 (La.
Ct. App. 1962) (seeking to set aside a judgment based on alleged fraud, error,
and “ill practice”).
74. In the reverse situation—when the counterparty has suffered losses—
the foreign governments may be sued in U.S. courts under the relevant
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straightforward breach of contract claims, 75 although some
involve claims under tort law 76 or various types of regulatory
law. 77
Under the doctrines discussed above, it is clear that foreign
governments have standing to initiate this kind of suit in order to
vindicate their own proprietary interests. 78 However, these
claims can sometimes raise complicated doctrinal questions
regarding the intersection between the standing of foreign
governments as plaintiffs and their immunity as defendants.
These questions arise when a foreign government sues a
defendant who subsequently raises a counterclaim. If the
counterclaim is related directly to the original claim, then the act
of initiating litigation is viewed as a waiver of immunity with
respect to the counterclaim. 79 If not, however, then the immunity
provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1604
(2012).
75. See, e.g., Belize v. Howtzer Corp., 144 F. App’x 849, 849 (11th Cir. 2005)
(concerning a breach of contract claim for the purchase of prefabricated homes);
Government of the Republic of China v. Compass Commc’ns Corp., 473 F. Supp.
1306, 1308–09 (D.D.C. 1979) (concerning a breach of contract claim for the
purchase of electronics); Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Air Capital Group,
LLC, No. 12–20607–CIV, 2013 WL 3223686, at *9 (S.D. Fla. June 24, 2013)
(concerning a breach of service contract for aircraft maintenance); Government
of the Republic of South Africa v. Sonsino, No. 10 Civ. 6554 (NRB), 2011 WL
4357381, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2011) (concerning the breach of a
residential lease agreement).
76. See, e.g., Australia v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., No. 69–1623, 1972 WL
232615, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 1972) (concerning a product liability claim
against the manufacturer of aircraft purchased by the plaintiff); Republic of
France v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 96 N.J.L. 25, 26–28 (N.J. 1921) (concerning a
negligence claim against the railroad for damage to goods).
77. In one case, for instance, several governments brought claims against a
New York textile company under the Lanham Act, alleging that the defendant’s
use of a particular trademark interfered with their intellectual property rights.
W. Indian Sea Island Cotton Ass’n v. Threadtex, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 1041, 1043–
47 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also Libya v. Miski, 889 F. Supp. 2d 144, 147–48 (D.D.C.
2012) (involving a claim by Libya under trademark law and the
AntiCybersquatting Consumer Protection Act related to its own business
operations in the United States); Complaint ¶¶ 13–15, Republic of Colombia v.
Unicof, USA, No. 01-31-A, 2001 WL 36081532 (E.D. Va. Jan. 9, 2001)
(discussing claims filed by Colombia alleging trademark infringement by a U.S.
coffee company).
78. See supra Part II.A (discussing the law governing standing of foreign
governments).
79. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1607(b) (2012).
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continues. Additionally, some courts have recognized a right of
set-off. 80
4. Claims for Injunctive Relief Following Alleged
Treaty Violations
Litigation of this kind is relatively rare. Some of the claims
in this category are routine, involving issues such as efforts by
municipalities to tax premises used by foreign consulates for
governmental purposes. 81 Others, however, can raise significant
foreign relations concerns. 82 In 2015, for example, a federal
district court in California considered a claim brought by the
Marshall Islands alleging that the United States had breached its
obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons by failing to pursue negotiations for nuclear
disarmament. 83 The court dismissed the claim, holding both that
the treaty did not create an enforceable obligation on the part of
the United States and that the claim raised a non-justiciable
political question. 84
One of the highest profile cases in this category is Republic of
Paraguay v. Allen, 85 a lawsuit filed by Paraguay against the
80. See Nat’l City Bank of N.Y. v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 365
(1955) (“[T]he ultimate thrust of the consideration of fair dealing . . . allows a
setoff or counterclaim based on the same subject matter . . . .”).
81. See, e.g., Republic of Finland v. Pelham, 26 A.D.2d 35, 36–38 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1966) (addressing a claim by Finland that a New York township had
violated the 1934 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights between
the United States and Finland by taxing premises owned by Finland and used
for governmental purposes).
82. For an historical account of suits brought by foreign states alleging
treaty violations, see Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme Court of the United States as
Quasi-International Tribunal: Reclaiming the Court’s Original and Exclusive
Jurisdiction Over Treaty-Based Suits by Foreign States Against States, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1765, 1867–81 (2004).
83. See Republic of the Marshall Islands v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 3d
1068, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (discussing the Marshall Islands’ action seeking an
injunction to compel the United States to comply with treaty obligations).
84. See id. at 1073 (holding that “[w]hat constitutes good faith efforts to
pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear
arms race are determinations for the political branches to make”).
85. 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
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Commonwealth of Virginia to enforce certain treaty provisions. 86
That case involved the arrest, detention, and subsequent
sentencing to death of Angel Breard, a Paraguayan citizen. 87
Under the terms of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, to which both Paraguay and the United States are
party, law enforcement officials of one state arresting a national
of another member state must inform him of his right to
communicate with a consular officer. 88 If he so requests, they
must then inform the relevant consular officers of the detention
and permit them to render assistance. 89 The police officers who
arrested Breard did not comply with these requirements, and
Paraguay alleged injury to its sovereign interest in protecting its
citizens abroad. 90 The Government sought relief, including the
vacation of the conviction. 91
In denying a petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court stated
that “neither the text nor the history of the Vienna Convention
clearly provides a foreign nation a private right of action in
United States’ courts to set aside a criminal conviction and
sentence for violation of consular notification provisions.” 92 It
further held that the Eleventh Amendment provided the
Commonwealth of Virginia with immunity from a lawsuit
initiated by a foreign sovereign. 93
Cases such as these squarely raise questions regarding the
deference of the judiciary to the executive branch in interpreting
and applying treaties, as well as questions regarding the direct
operation of international law within our legal system. 94 They do
86. Id. at 624–26.
87. Id. at 624–25.
88. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36, Mar. 19, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (1967).
89. Id.
90. Republic of Paraguay, 134 F.3d at 625–26.
91. Id.
92. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377 (1998).
93. Id. at 377–78 (citing Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329–30
(1934)). For further discussion, see Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, The
Abiding Relevance of Federalism to United States Foreign Relations, 92 AM. J.
INT’L L. 675 (1998) (describing reactions of the international legal community to
the Breard decision).
94. For other examples of such claims, see Federal Republic of Germany v.
United States, 526 U.S. 111, 111–12 (1999) (seeking an injunction prohibiting
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not, however, raise concerns regarding the appropriateness of
suit in a U.S. court.
A less complicated form of litigation in this category involves
claims arising in connection with the United States’ obligations
under multilateral trade agreements. In several cases,
governments have sought injunctions preventing the Department
of Commerce from conducting countervailing duty investigations
of particular products from their countries 95 or challenging the
Department’s anti-dumping determinations. 96
5. Claims for Monetary Relief for Damages Suffered in Connection
with Unlawful Conduct Occurring Within the Foreign State
This category includes a wide variety of claims. While all
involve conduct occurring within the territory of the sovereign
plaintiff, some are brought against the U.S. and others against
foreign defendants. Moreover, some assert claims pursuant to
foreign law, while others are brought under U.S. law (including
various forms of regulatory law).
In several cases, foreign governments seek damages for
environmental harms allegedly caused by the activity of U.S.
corporations. One of the earliest and most prominent examples of
this sort of litigation is the claim against Union Carbide
Corporation for damages caused by the gas explosion disaster in
Bhopal, India, in the 1980s. 97 More recent examples include
complaints filed in 2007 by several provinces within the Republic
Arizona’s execution of a German citizen pending resolution of a case before the
International Court of Justice, arguing that this execution would violate the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations); United Mexican States v. Woods,
126 F.3d 1220, 1221–22 (9th Cir. 1997) (concerning a claim that Arizona’s
execution of a Mexican citizen would violate the Vienna Convention, as well as
two other treaties).
95. See, e.g., Government of the People’s Republic of China v. United
States, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1275–76 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2007) (seeking an
injunction to stop an investigation of trade in coated free sheet paper).
96. See, e.g., Empresa Nacional Siderurgica, S.A. v. United States, 880 F.
Supp. 876, 877 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1995) (challenging a dumping determination of
the Department of Commerce regarding imports of steel plates).
97. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India, 809
F.2d 195, 197–98 (2d Cir. 1987) (addressing personal injury and wrongful death
actions brought by private plaintiffs, as well as the government of India).
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of Ecuador against a U.S. corporation with which the government
of Colombia had contracted to exterminate cocaine plantations. 98
These complaints alleged that the defendant oversprayed
fumigants into Ecuadorian territory, causing environmental
damage to land and water sources and exposing residents to toxic
chemicals. 99 The governments sought compensatory as well as
punitive damages. 100
Other claims brought by foreign governments against U.S.
defendants have a more transnational aspect in that they seek
the application of U.S. rather than foreign law, even though the
damages in question occurred outside the United States. Some
have been brought against U.S. companies pursuant to U.S.
antitrust 101 or securities law. 102 The majority of these claims are
initiated under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), 103 and include a number of cases
against large U.S. tobacco companies. 104 Many of these claims
involve not only U.S. but also foreign defendants. 105 In 2008, for
example, the Republic of Iraq initiated litigation against over

98. See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 27–67, Province of Esmereldas, Republic of
Ecuador v. Dyncorp Aerospace Operations LLC, No. 07-60311 CIV-MARRA,
2007 WL 1293469 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2007) (alleging seven claims against a U.S.
corporation, including trespass, nuisance, and negligence).
99. Id. ¶¶ 13–16.
100. Id. ¶¶ 68–70.
101. See In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 315, 315–16
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (concerning a claim brought by Kuwait against U.S.
manufacturers, alleging acts to restrain competition as to foreign sales); Pfizer
v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612, 613–14 (8th Cir. 1975) (concerning claims brought by
India, Iran, the Philippines, and Vietnam alleging a conspiracy to fix prices on
antibiotics purchased by those governments).
102. See Dept. of Econ. Dev. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 139 F.R.D. 295, 297
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (seeking application of U.S. securities law in connection with a
failed investment).
103. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2013).
104. These claims are discussed in detail below. Infra Part III.A.1; see also
Republic of Colombia v. Diageo N. Am. Inc., 531 F. Supp. 2d 365, 367–77
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (addressing a RICO claim against U.S. and foreign liquor
manufacturers).
105. See, e.g., Att’y Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268
F.3d 103, 105–08 (2d Cir. 2001) (naming foreign entities, as well as R.J.
Reynolds U.S., in its RICO suit); Republic of Colombia, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 376–
77 (naming U.S. and foreign entities as defendants).
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ninety companies, mostly foreign, alleging that their corruption of
the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program violated RICO. 106
Finally, some litigation in this category seeks the application
of U.S. law to claims against only foreign defendants. Several of
these, including claims by certain governments against their
former heads of state, involve conduct that bears little or no
nexus to the United States. They are discussed in detail below. 107

*

*

*

The vast majority of claims initiated by foreign
governments create no particular foreign relations concerns.
This observation applies to most litigation arising from foreign
governments’ commercial activities. It also applies to requests
for judicial assistance, which arise within the framework of
existing treaties between the United States and the foreign
government plaintiff. 108 Indeed, in this sense the review above
simply confirms what is evident from a review of judicial
activity more generally: U.S. courts are already deeply engaged
in ordinary processes of the transnational order. 109 These cases
106. Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG, 920 F. Supp. 2d 517, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 2013),
aff’d, 768 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2014).
107. Infra Part III.A.3.
108. Even the cases brought under § 1782 generate few separation of powers
concerns, because they involve rights to judicial assistance that have been
bestowed on the foreign governments by statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2012).
109. U.S. courts frequently apply international or foreign substantive law in
ordinary civil litigation between private parties. For instance, the Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods governs contracts entered into by
parties in different member states if they have not selected another governing
law. See Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18, annex I (Apr. 10, 1980),
reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668, 668 (1980). Under ordinary choice of law rules, U.S.
courts frequently apply foreign law to tort or contract claims. U.S. courts also
engage in transnational litigation process when they play the role assigned to
them under various procedural treaties. Under the New York Arbitration
Convention, for instance, they are charged with recognizing and enforcing
foreign arbitral awards that meet certain basic requirements. United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art.
5, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3. Under a number of procedural law
conventions, they are charged with carrying out functions such as discovery
within certain parameters. See, e.g., Convention on the Taking of Evidence
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847
U.NT.S. 241; see also Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global
Governance, 84 TUL. L. REV. 67, 69 (2009) (noting that “domestic courts are
pervasively involved in the regulation of transnational activity”); id. at 74–96
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establish a baseline of relatively routine interaction between
U.S. courts and foreign governments—interaction that often
directly supports the interests of those governments, as well as
those of the United States. Furthermore, of the cases that do
implicate foreign relations, most are initiated in the United
States for readily understandable reasons (for instance, because
the defendant is a corporation based in the United States).
However, foreign governments sometimes initiate litigation
in U.S. courts under the very circumstances that in other
contexts are seen to create interference with foreign sovereign
interests. The data described above include claims that are far
more closely connected with other countries than with the
United States, raising questions regarding the appropriateness
of U.S. judicial involvement. They include claims that seek the
application of U.S. regulatory law to foreign conduct—in other
words, inviting the extraterritorial application of U.S. law. And
the data include claims in which foreign governments seek
remedies such as treble damages and punitive damages that
they have, in other contexts, criticized as violating their own
public policies. 110
The strategic objectives of foreign sovereigns in filing such
claims vary, and are difficult to ascertain definitively. The goal
of this study is to investigate more closely the legal and policy
arguments included in the governments’ complaints, using them
as a lens through which to consider the prevailing narrative
regarding U.S. judicial engagement.
III. Revisiting the Foreign Relations Narrative
This Part presents three case studies, using them to
investigate more closely the foreign policy implications of U.S.
judicial engagement in matters involving foreign sovereigns. It

(providing a systematic analysis of their global governance functions).
110. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 309 (1978)
(“In this case we are asked to decide whether a foreign nation is entitled to sue
in our courts for treble damages under the antitrust laws. The respondents are
the Government of India, the Imperial Government of Iran, and the Republic of
the Philippines.”).
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then uses that analysis to revisit the traditional account of U.S.
judicial activity as it affects foreign sovereign interests.
A. Case Studies
1. Tobacco Litigation
A significant number of foreign governments have initiated
litigation in U.S. courts against both U.S. and foreign tobacco
producers. Plaintiffs include Belize, Bolivia, several states of
Brazil, Canada, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, the Marshall
Islands, Nicaragua, Panama, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and
Venezuela. 111 In addition, the European Community initiated
litigation on its own behalf and on behalf of twenty-six member
states of the European Union. 112
The complaints in these cases articulate several different
reasons for the decision to sue in the United States. First, several
of the complaints take note of garden-variety jurisdictional or
other barriers that block access to foreign courts. In one case, for
example, the plaintiff stated that
Honduras brings these claims in this jurisdiction [Southern
District of Florida] since it can obtain personal jurisdiction
over the Defendants in one location and much of the evidence
is in this jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Republic of Honduras
111. See generally Republic of Honduras v. Philip Morris Cos., 341 F.3d 1253
(11th Cir. 2003) (addressing consolidated claims of the Republic of Belize, the
Republic of Ecuador, and the Republic of Honduras); Republic of Venezuela v.
Philip Morris Inc., 287 F.3d 192 (D.D.C. 2002) (addressing consolidated claims
of the Republic of Ecuador, the Republic of Venezuela, the Russian Federation,
and the Brazilian states of Mato Grosso Do Sol, Goais, and Espirito Santo);
Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., 249 F.3d
1068 (D.D.C. 2001) (addressing consolidated claims Republic of Guatemala, the
Republic of Nicaragua, and Ukraine); Att’y Gen. of Can. v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco
Holdings, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 134 (N.D.N.Y. 2000); Republic of Bolivia v. Philip
Morris Cos., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (S.D. Tex. 1999); Republic of Panama v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 2006 WL 1933740 (Del. Super. Ct. 2006) (addressing claims of
Panama and the State of Sao Paulo, Brazil); Answer, Republic of Tajikistan v.
Brooke Group Ltd. Inc., No. 01-607-Civ-Moore/O’Sullivan, 2001 WL 34621727
(S.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2001); Complaint, Citizens of the Republic of the Marshall
Islands v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 00000, 1997 WL 33633052 (D. Haw. June 1997).
112. European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 764 F.3d 129 (2nd Cir. 2014),
cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 28 (2015).
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is investigating its prosecutorial options with respect to the
responsible parties, but is not likely to obtain jurisdiction in
Honduras at this point, over those individuals and
defendants. 113

Second, some of the complaints assert that the individuals
affected by the defendants’ conduct would be unable to obtain
compensatory relief in their own countries. For instance, many of
the tobacco claims brought by developing countries included
requests by the foreign governments to be accorded parens
patriae standing in order to represent the interests of citizens
lacking local redress. The governments of Panama and the State
of Sao Paolo, for instance, argued that the individuals harmed by
tobacco use would have no meaningful opportunity to seek
compensation locally, and therefore that the governments should
be permitted to represent their interests in U.S. litigation. 114
Third, many of the claims appear to be in a U.S. forum because
the plaintiff seeks the application of U.S. regulatory law, such as
RICO or antitrust law. 115
The theories on which these lawsuits proceeded differ. One
group of claims alleged that the tobacco companies participated
in smuggling conspiracies that harmed the foreign governments
in question by depriving them of tax revenue and increasing their
law enforcement costs. The Canadian government, for instance,
113. First Amended Complaint ¶ 2, Republic of Honduras v. Philip Morris
Int’l, Inc., No. 01-2847-Civ-Moreno/O’Sullivan, 2001 WL 34680245 (S.D. Fla.
Dec. 20, 2001).
114. See Republic of Panama v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 05C-07-181-RRC, 2006
WL 1933740, at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. June 23, 2006) (consolidating claims by
Panama and the State of Sao Paulo, Brazil). The court was unreceptive to this
argument, stating that
[i]f this Court accepted the Foreign Governments’ argument, that
parens patriae standing might be applicable in Delaware Superior
Court to some countries in this world, but not to others (because of
considerations of whether or not a particular country . . . was
sufficiently “developed” or not) that would create a near-impossible
burden for this Court . . . .
Id.
115. Because a foreign court will not apply U.S. regulatory law, such claims
must necessarily be brought in the United States. See Philip J. McConnaughay,
Reviving the “Public Law Taboo” in International Conflict of Laws, 35 STAN. J.
INT’L L. 255, 262 (1999) (tracing this principle to “the centuries old refusal of
nations to enforce the penal or revenue laws of other nations”).
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argued that the defendants established a cross-border smuggling
scheme that resulted in cigarettes being sold on the black market
rather than through taxed channels of commerce. 116 The purpose
and effect of this scheme, the Government argued, was to deprive
it of the duties and taxes that otherwise would have been payable
upon the sale of the cigarettes. 117 The Government also argued
that the scheme caused further harm by requiring the
government to expend additional funds on enforcement activity
intended to end the unlawful behavior. 118 The governments of
Belize, Ecuador, and Honduras brought similar lawsuits alleging
the use of free trade zones to insulate the goods from taxation. 119
These claims alleged that the defendants’ schemes to avoid local
taxes violated RICO, along with other U.S. state and common
laws. 120
The courts hearing these lawsuits eventually dismissed them
on the basis of the so-called “revenue rule,” which provides that
the courts of one country will not enforce tax claims, or judgments
for the payment of taxes, of another sovereign. 121 The respective
116. See Att’y Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 103 F.
Supp. 2d 134, 138 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (arguing that the alleged cross-border
smuggling scheme arose following tax increases on tobacco products, which, in
Canada, rose 550% between 1982 and 1991), aff’d, 268 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001).
117. See id. at 137–38 (alleging that defendant tobacco company, its
subsidiaries, and the Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers Council implemented
the scheme to stave off declining profits).
118. Id. at 143.
119. See Republic of Ecuador v. Philip Morris Cos., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1359,
1360 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (seeking damages for lost tax revenues and additional law
enforcement expenses incurred as result of the defendants’ alleged involvement
in tobacco smuggling), aff’d, Republic of Honduras v. Philip Morris Cos., 341
F.3d 1253, 1255 (11th Cir. 2003) (consolidating six separate appeals by the
Republics of Belize, Ecuador, and Honduras).
120. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 149 (noting
that Canada brought claims against the defendants under RICO’s civil
enforcement provision); Republic of Ecuador, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1362 (“Ecuador
brings state law common law causes of action for fraud, intentional
misrepresentation, conspiracy and concert of action . . . . Additionally, Ecuador
asserts causes of action under the Florida RICO statute.”).
121. See Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 360–61 (2005)
(considering application of the revenue rule in the context of a criminal
prosecution, rather than a civil lawsuit); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 483 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“Courts
in the United States are not required to recognize or to enforce judgments for
the collection of taxes, fines, or penalties rendered by the courts of other
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courts held that although the claims were brought under RICO,
the ultimate goal of the litigation was to enforce foreign revenue
laws. 122 In affirming the dismissal of the claims of Belize,
Ecuador, and Honduras on the basis of the revenue rule, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit explored the doctrine’s
rationale. 123 Under the heading “Respect for Sovereignty,” it cited
the two major justifications for the rule. First, it “exists to
prevent the courts of a sovereign nation from enforcing policy
choices of a foreign sovereign that might run counter to its
own.” 124 Second, it “promote[s] harmony between sovereigns by
preventing one sovereign from asserting its political will in
another sovereign through actions to enforce its revenue laws.” 125
Other tobacco litigation did not focus on lost tax revenue, but
rather on the harms caused in the foreign countries by the
defendants’ products. 126 Venezuela’s complaint, for instance,
stated:
states.”). For a critical review of the doctrine, see William J. Kovatch, Jr.,
Recognizing Foreign Tax Judgments: An Argument for the Revocation of the
Revenue Rule, 22 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 265, 266–87 (2000) (criticizing application of
the revenue rule in cases brought by foreign sovereign plaintiffs).
122. See, e.g., Att’y Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 103
F. Supp. 2d 134, 143 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[T]o pursue its claim for damages
relating to lost tax revenue, Canada will have to prove, and the Court will have
to pass on, the validity of the Canadian revenue laws and their applicability
hereto and the Court would be, in essence, enforcing Canadian revenue laws.”),
aff’d, 268 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001); see also European Comty. v. RJR Nabisco,
Inc., 424 F.3d 175, 182–83 (2d Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal of claims by the
European Community, along with a number of Colombian states, on the basis of
the revenue rule).
123. Republic of Honduras v. Philip Morris Cos., 341 F.3d 1253, 1256–59
(11th Cir. 2003).
124. Id. at 1257.
125. Id. For another example of this application of the revenue rule, see
Republic of Colombia v. Diageo N. Am. Inc., 531 F. Supp. 2d 365, 375–76
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (involving a claim against U.S. and foreign liquor
manufacturers). Colombia alleged that a group of liquor manufacturers
participated in a scheme to launder the proceeds of illegal drug sales and
smuggle liquor into Colombia. Id. at 375. The court determined that to the
extent the claims were based on (a) damages resulting from unpaid taxes on
alcohol, or (b) damages suffered by Colombia in its sovereign capacity, they were
barred by the revenue rule. Id. at 391. It declined, however, to dismiss the
claims that were based on damages flowing from money laundering. Id. at 398.
126. These claims paralleled the litigation brought by U.S. state attorneys
general against the tobacco industry. See generally Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra
note 31 (describing U.S.-based litigation against the tobacco industry).
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For decades, BIG TOBACCO’s conduct has caused an
incalculable loss of life, disease . . . and economic loss to the
users of BIG TOBACCO’s products which economic loss was
and is ultimately borne by the Republic as the provider of
medical assistance to the users . . . . Furthermore, the
Republic has suffered economic damages as a result of the
decreased productivity of its labor force . . . . 127

A number of other governments, including that of Guatemala,
filed similar complaints, alleging violations of RICO, antitrust
law, and common law. 128 The complaints emphasized that the
governments had suffered direct injury, in the form of “economic
harms to their treasuries that are independent of any harms
allegedly suffered by their residents as a result of smoking
defendants’ products.” 129 U.S. courts have generally rejected
these claims for lack of proximate cause. In the Guatemalan case,
for example, the court concluded that the government failed to
establish that its “claimed economic harms were not caused by
other independent factors.” 130 These decisions also invoke the
principle that a party who pays for the medical expenses of an
injured individual may not generally bring an independent action
to recover those expenses from the party who caused the
injury. 131
127. See Complaint for Damages ¶ 44, Republic of Venezuela v. Philip
Morris Cos., No. 99-01943 CA25, 1999 WL 33740594 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 27, 1999)
(alleging violations of both foreign and Florida tort law, as well as several
Florida statutes).
128. See In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litig., 83 F. Supp.
2d 125, 127–28 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d sub nom., Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Health &
Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., 249 F.3d 1068, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(considering on appeal the claims of Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Ukraine); see
also Republic of Panama v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 05C-07-181-RRC, 2006 WL
1933740, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. June 23, 2006) (consolidating claims by Panama
and the State of Sao Paulo, Brazil that seek the application of Panamanian and
Brazilian law).
129. See Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Health & Welfare Fund, 249 F.3d at 1071
(asserting that, because the government is obligated to provide free health care
and other forms of social welfare to citizens, the nation itself is the appropriate
plaintiff to recover damages).
130. See id. at 1074 (commenting on the “derivative nature of the alleged
injuries”).
131. See Republic of Venezuela v. Philip Morris Cos., 827 So. 2d 339, 341
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that “case precedent and settled common-law
principles establish that one who pays for the medical expenses of another, may
not bring a direct, independent action to recover those expenses from the alleged
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One major lawsuit in this category is still pending: that of
the European Community. While the court dismissed the first set
of claims by the European Community on the basis of the revenue
rule, 132 the Community later filed additional complaints against
tobacco companies. 133 These claims did not focus on lost tax
revenue:
The Complaint alleges that RJR directed, managed, and
controlled a global money-laundering scheme with organized
crime groups in violation of the RICO statute, laundered
money through New York-based financial institutions and
repatriated the profits of the scheme to the United States, and
committed various common law torts in violation of New York
state law. 134

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit permitted the
extraterritorial application of RICO to the defendants’ conduct,
given the circumstances of the case. 135 It therefore vacated the
decision of the district court, granted the defendants’ motion to
dismiss, and remanded the case. 136 Following two unsuccessful

tortfeasor”); see also Sean D. Murphy, Guatemalan Suit Against U.S. Tobacco
Companies, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 541, 541–43 (2000) (summarizing Guatemala’s
suit against U.S. tobacco companies and the requirements for standing in a
parens patriae action).
132. See European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 424 F.3d 175, 182 (2d Cir.
2007) (“[U]nder any of the available formulations of the revenue rule, plaintiffs’
claims are barred.”).
133. See European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-CV-5771, 2011 WL
843957, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011) (concerning five alleged violations of the
RICO Act and nine common law torts in relation to the defendants’ cigarette
sales practices). For a summary of the history of the European Community’s
litigation, see id. at *1–2.
134. European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 764 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2014).
135. See id. at 139 (“[B]ecause Plaintiffs have alleged that all elements of
the wire fraud, money fraud, and Travel Act violations were completed in the
United States or while crossing U.S. borders, we conclude that the Complaint
states domestic RICO claims based on violations of those predicates.”). The
court’s application of the presumption against extraterritoriality is discussed
further below.
136. Id. at 149.
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attempts to obtain rehearing, 137 the defendants filed a petition for
certiorari, which has been granted. 138
2. Environmental Damage
In 2006, the Dominican Republic filed a complaint in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against AES
Corporation, a utility company headquartered there. 139 Through
subsidiaries, including one in the Dominican Republic, AES
operated a number of power plants. 140 The complaint alleged that
AES and several Dominican companies and individuals
(including elected officials) conspired to dump tons of coal ash
waste generated by AES’s Puerto Rican plant in the Dominican
Republic, damaging the environment and creating health risks
for local citizens. 141 The complaint sought compensatory and
punitive damages under both U.S. and Dominican law, including
RICO, the Alien Tort Statute, and environmental law. 142
The Government filed the complaint in the U.S. court where
the defendant was subject to general jurisdiction. 143 However,
that was not its only reason for filing the lawsuit there. First, the
Government gestured toward the difficulty it experienced as host
to foreign investment in effectively regulating the activities of
137. European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 764 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2014)
(denying rehearing); European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 783 F.3d 123, 124
(2d Cir. 2015) (denying rehearing en banc).
138. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 28 (2015).
139. First Amended Complaint ¶ 1, Government of the Dominican Republic
v. AES Corp., 466 F. Supp. 2d 680 (E.D. Va. 2006) (No. 06-313).
140. See id. ¶¶ 4–5 (noting that AES is one of the world’s largest power
companies and “operates its day-to-day business through more than 700
subsidiaries”).
141. See id. ¶ 11 (alleging that AES conspired with multiple companies
based in the Dominican Republic to dump coal ash waste without having to pay
the higher costs associated with proper disposal).
142. See id. ¶¶ 92–128 (listing a total of seven claims against AES).
143. This is true of other cases in this category. In another lawsuit arising
from environmental harm, for instance, provinces of the Republic of Ecuador
argued that they would not have access to relief in the courts of Ecuador
because personal jurisdiction could not be obtained there over the U.S. corporate
defendants. Complaint ¶ 2, Province of Sucumbios v. Dyncorp Aerospace
Operations LLC, No. 06-61926 Civ-Altonaga, 2006 WL 4035611 (S.D. Fla. Dec.
2006).
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large transnational corporations. The complaint included certain
allegations speaking to the balance of power between the local
government and the defendant corporation:
5. Defendant AES operates its day-to-day business through
more than 700 subsidiaries. . . . Defendant AES constructed
this elaborate web of subsidiaries to protect the “parent”
company from legal and financial liabilities resulting from its
global operations.
20. . . . The AES Defendants are the largest direct foreign
investor in the economy of the Dominican Republic. . . . The
economic strength of the AES defendants (with a market
capitalization of $11.15 billion compared to the Dominican
Republic’s gross domestic product of $55.68 billion) . . . . 144

Second, the Government raised more general capacity
arguments regarding its own judiciary. The complaint included a
passage specifically addressing the sorts of sovereignty concerns
that might arise in this type of claim:
20. Plaintiff cannot file this action and obtain justice in the
courts of the Dominican Republic. Although Plaintiff is
striving to improve the judicial system of the Dominican
Republic, the present judicial system is not able to resolve this
particular action in a fair and impartial manner. . . . [T]he
Dominican Republic [has] a valid and well-founded fear that
the present judicial system may be susceptible to being
influenced by corruption.
21. Plaintiff will not view this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction
over this action as an affront or intrusion into the sovereign
affairs of the Dominican Republic. On the contrary, this action
is an affirmation of national sovereignty as it seeks redress of
grievances within its territory in a venue where the
perpetrator of the grievance has legal residence. Plaintiff, the
government of the Dominican Republic, has determined that it
furthers the national and sovereign interests of the Dominican
Republic and its citizens to seek compensation in the federal
courts of the United States for the unlawful acts of American
corporations. 145

The complaint in this case did not seek parens patriae
standing; rather, the government sought compensation for harm
144. First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 5, 20, Dominican Republic, 466 F. Supp.
2d 680 (No. 06-313).
145. Id. ¶¶ 20–21.
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it
suffered
directly. 146
Applying
traditional
standing
requirements, the court found that the Dominican Republic had
standing to assert the claims based on pollution damage. 147 It
concluded, however, that the Government did not have standing
“to assert claims for the costs its state-run health system
incurred in caring for inhabitants injured by the coal ash
pollution.” 148 Because those injuries were suffered by specific
individuals, the court held, those individuals would need to assert
their own claims individually. 149 The court further concluded that
under Virginia choice-of-law principles, the law of the place of the
wrong—that is, the law of the Dominican Republic—would apply
to the non-RICO claims. 150 The court dismissed the RICO claims
on the ground that the plaintiff failed to establish a pattern of
racketeering. 151
The defendants in this litigation raised the act of state
doctrine as a defense, arguing that the case would require the
146. See id. ¶¶ 89–91, 129 (seeking compensatory and punitive damages for
physical, mental, and economic injuries).
147. See Government of the Dominican Republic v. AES Corp., 466 F. Supp.
2d 680, 688 (E.D. Va. 2006) (determining that the Dominican Republic suffered
a concrete and particularized injury, that the injury was fairly traceable to the
defendant’s conduct, and that its injuries could be redressed in the form of
monetary damages).
148. See id. (determining that the State was not the proper party to bring a
claim based on those costs, even though it arguably suffered a concrete and
particularized harm that was traceable to the defendant’s conduct).
149. Id. The court noted that the government could assist individuals
harmed by the actions of AES in pursuing a legal remedy. Id. The court in the
DeCoster also made this point. See Estado Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 229
F.3d 332, 342 (1st Cir. 2000) (“Mexico, however, is not left powerless to address
these concerns . . . . [It] could financially support the plaintiffs in their efforts or
seek to participate as amicus.”).
150. Id. at 693. Note that the applicability of foreign law creates a basis at
the next stage of litigation for dismissal on the basis of forum non conveniens.
Some courts have avoided this entire analysis by simply holding that plaintiffs
did not adequately establish proof of foreign law, thus opening the way to
application of forum law. See, e.g., Republic of Panama v. Am. Tobacco Co., No.
05C-07-181-RRC, 2006 WL 1933740, at *4–5 (Del. Super. Ct. June 23, 2006)
(determining that Delaware law would apply to all claims made by the foreign
governments).
151. See Dominican Republic, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 692 (determining that the
alleged predicate acts of the defendants did not satisfy the continuity test,
necessary to establish a pattern of racketeering under RICO, because the
complaint did not indicate that the alleged dumping activities would occur again
in the future).
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court to adjudicate the validity of a coal ash dumping permit
issued by the Dominican Republic. 152 The court rejected this
argument, stating that the case turned not on the validity of that
act but rather on the effects of the pollution caused by AES. 153 It
also noted:
Given that the Government of the Dominican Republic itself is
the plaintiff in this case, the principles that the act of state
doctrine was created to uphold should not be adversely
affected (i.e., the American executive should not be
embarrassed, and international comity and respect for foreign
sovereigns will continue). 154

3. Misdeeds of Former Heads of Government
In a number of cases, successor governments initiated
litigation in U.S. courts to recover damages suffered as the result
of misappropriations by previous heads of government. These
include claims brought by the Republic of Chile, 155 the Republic of
Haiti, 156 the Islamic Republic of Iran, 157 and the Republic of
Panama. 158
The plaintiffs in some of these cases brought claims not
against the former head of state himself, but against financial
institutions involved in laundering the proceeds of
152. Id. at 694–95.
153. See id. (emphasizing that the state “doctrine does not take the form of
an absolute or inflexible rule, but rather requires a careful case-by-case
analysis”).
154. Id.
155. See generally Amended Complaint, Consejo de Defensa del Estado de la
Republica de Chile v. Banco Santander Central Hispano, S.A., No. 09-20621,
2009 WL 2336429 (S.D. Fla. May 29, 2009) (relating to misappropriations by
Augusto Pinochet); Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, Consejo de Defensa del
Estado de la Republica de Chile v. Banco de Chile, No. 109CV20614, 2009 WL
1612255 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2009) (same).
156. See Complaint at 11, Republic of Haiti v. Aristide, No. 05-22852, 2005
WL 3521251 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 2005) (stating claims against Jean-Bertrand
Aristide under RICO for “theft, conversion, fraud and breach of fiduciary duty”).
157. See generally Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 464 N.Y.S.2d 487 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1983) (concerning misappropriations by the former Shah, Mohammed Reza
Pahlavi).
158. See generally Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings, 119 F.3d 935 (11th
Cir. 1997) (concerning misappropriations by Manuel Noriega).
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misappropriation. Chile, for example, sued both U.S. and foreign
banks under RICO, alleging that they had participated in money
laundering. 159 Panama initiated a similar lawsuit against U.S.
and foreign banks, also asserting RICO claims, alleging that they
had participated in Noriega’s diversion of public funds. 160 While
some of these claims involved only a foreign defendant, they all
included allegations of U.S.-based conduct—including in the form
of participation by U.S. branches of the defendant banks—as part
of the necessarily cross-border capital flows. 161
Other lawsuits involved claims against former heads of
government themselves, based on conduct that occurred outside
the United States. The Republic of the Philippines, for instance,
sued Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos for damages related to their
theft of money from the public fisc; 162 Iran’s claims, similarly,
were lodged directly against the former Shah and his relatives. 163
Such claims raise thorny foreign affairs issues, to which U.S.
courts generally respond using the doctrines of act of state and
political question. In the litigation against Ferdinand and Imelda
Marcos, for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit began its jurisdictional analysis with this note of caution:
Plaintiff’s case is a ringing indictment of Mr. Marcos’ conduct
as President of the Philippines during his 20 years in office. As
such, it challenges not merely individual misdeeds or
159. See Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 155, ¶ 20 (alleging
instances of money laundering by approximately ten U.S. banks).
160. See Republic of Panama, 119 F.3d at 938–39 (alleging that BCCI
laundered the diverted funds and redistributed them to various accounts
throughout the world, which effectively made them available to Noriega for
personal use).
161. See Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 155, ¶¶ 39–41
(alleging links between multiple U.S.-based bank accounts and Pinochet);
Republic of Panama, 119 F.3d at 940 (alleging links between multiple U.S.based bank accounts and Noriega).
162. See Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 818 F.2d 1473, 1480–81 (9th
Cir. 1987) (alleging that Marcos and others extorted and embezzled millions of
dollars from the Philippine government), reh’g en banc, 862 F.2d 1355, 1360–61
(9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (determining, among other things, that the suit was
not barred under the act of state or political question doctrines).
163. See generally Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 464 N.Y.S.2d 487
(N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (involving claims against Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the
former Shah of Iran); Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 473 N.Y.S.2d 801
(N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (involving claims against Ashraf Pahlavi, Mohammed
Reza Pahlavi’s sister).
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indiscretions but the very way in which Mr. Marcos wielded
governmental power, retained that power and ran the
Philippine government. This raises a variety of serious and
sensitive questions about the ability of our courts to adjudicate
this issue, and the propriety of their doing so. In effect, we
must consider whether our courts are the appropriate forum
for adjudicating what appears to be at least in part a political
dispute between the Philippines’ current government and its
former ruler. 164

The Ninth Circuit heard the claims twice, first by a panel and
then in rehearing en banc. 165 The court reached different
conclusions in each opinion regarding the act of state and
political question doctrines. The panel concluded that the act of
state doctrine precluded the plaintiff’s claims because they would
require the court to adjudicate whether Marcos’s actions while
serving as President were lawful under Philippine law. 166
Similarly, it characterized the complaint as raising “essentially
political questions,” again concluding that judicial intervention
would be unwise despite “the acquiescence—indeed anxious
invitation—of the current Philippine government.” 167 In the
subsequent rehearing en banc, the court concluded that the act of
state doctrine did not insulate a former dictator from claims
arising out of his actions, nor did the political question doctrine

164. Republic of the Philippines, 818 F.2d at 1480.
165. After the United States granted the Marcoses asylum, the Republic of
the Philippines brought claims under RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (1982), and
other applicable law. Republic of the Philippines, 818 F.2d at 1477. On June 25,
1986, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California granted a
preliminary injunction. Id. The Marcoses appealed, and a panel of the Ninth
Circuit reversed, with one judge dissenting. Id. at 1490. Rehearing the case en
banc, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court. Republic of the Philippines v.
Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1364 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (determining that the
district court had the authority “to issue a preliminary injunction to prevent a
defendant from dissipating assets in order to preserve the possibility of
equitable remedies”), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035 (1989).
166. See Republic of the Philippines, 818 F.2d at 1482 (distinguishing
between challenged actions undertaken by the government itself and those
undertaken by Ferdinand Marcos as a private citizen).
167. See id. at 1486, 1489 (“We cannot shut our eyes to the political realities
that give rise to this litigation, nor to the potential effect of its conduct and
resolution.”).
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insulate him from claims arising out of “acts for personal
profit.” 168
In a pair of cases, the Islamic Republic of Iran initiated
litigation in New York state courts against Mohammed Reza
Pahlavi, the former Shah of Iran, and Ashraf Pahlavi, his
sister. 169 Iran’s claims alleged that the defendants violated
fiduciary obligations under the law of Iran by converting
government and public assets for personal use. 170 They sought
both equitable relief (in the form of the imposition of a
constructive trust on all assets of the defendants) and monetary
relief (in the form of both compensatory and punitive
damages). 171 The court ultimately dismissed both of these cases
on the basis of forum non conveniens. 172 In each case, the court
noted that the claims related not only to the ownership of
particular property within the forum state, but rather to “all
monies and property” defendants received from the Iranian
government, wherever located. 173 As a result, the litigation would
168. See Republic of the Philippines, 862 F.2d at 1360–61 (noting that the
act of state doctrine “is meant to facilitate the foreign relations of the United
States, not to furnish the equivalent of sovereign immunity to a deposed leader”
and that “questions of foreign law are not beyond the capacity of our courts”).
169. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 464 N.Y.S.2d 487, 488 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1983); Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 473 N.Y.S.2d 801, 801–02 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1984).
170. See Islamic Republic of Iran, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 489 (alleging “misconduct
of the Shah in enriching himself and his family through the exercise and misuse
of his powers as emperor”); Islamic Republic of Iran, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 802
(alleging misconduct enriching the sister of the Shah).
171. See Islamic Republic of Iran, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 490 (discussing relief
sought by the plaintiff–government); Islamic Republic of Iran, 473 N.Y.S.2d at
801 (same).
172. See Islamic Republic of Iran, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 489–92 (determining that
the Shah’s stay at a New York hospital, which only lasted a few weeks, and the
presence of some of his assets in the state were insufficient to support
jurisdiction); Islamic Republic of Iran, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 802 (concluding that the
“action did not bear a substantial nexus to the State of New York,” even though
the plaintiff–respondent sought in rem jurisdiction).
173. See Islamic Republic of Iran, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 490 (“[T]his is not a case
of a dispute as to the ownership of specific property in this state. The complaint
asks to impress a constructive trust on assets of the defendants throughout the
world . . . .”); Islamic Republic of Iran, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 802 (noting that the
plaintiff sought “worldwide access” to the defendant’s assets). In this respect the
cases were quite different from those in which the plaintiff sought relief
regarding specific assets located within the United States. See, e.g., Republic of
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involve “a sweeping review of the political and financial
management of the Iranian government . . . with the object of
accounting for and repossessing the nation’s claimed lost
wealth” 174—a project with only a slight nexus to New York. In
that light, the courts concluded, there was insufficient
justification to deploy local judicial resources. 175 The courts cited
the particularly burdensome nature of the litigation, the
overcrowded state of New York courts, and the potential cost to
New York taxpayers. 176
B. Analysis
Even within this smaller group of claims, there is a wide
range of relationships between the parties, the cause of action,
and the United States. Some of the cases involve U.S. defendants,
for instance, and others only foreign defendants; some arise from
conduct occurring within the United States and others from
conduct occurring entirely elsewhere. As a result, the strength of
the connection between the claim and the United States—and the
relative strength of the connection between the claim and some
other country—varies significantly from case to case.
Moreover, the claims vary with respect to the relationship
between the choice of forum and applicable law. For claims
initiated under private law (for instance, tort law), the choice of a
U.S. forum would not generally result in any substantive law
the Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 361 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirming the
district court’s refusal to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens where
the injunction sought related only to property located in New York).
174. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 467 N.E.2d 245, 250 (N.Y. 1984).
175. See Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 464 N.Y.S.2d 487, 489 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1983) (declaring that the claims do not legitimately concern the State
of New York, and that they are uniquely Iranian matters “based on acts in Iran
relating to the affairs of Iran”); Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 473 N.Y.S.2d
801, 802 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (“[W]e remain convinced that New York’s
connection with all of this is, at best, tenuous and the better approach is to
exercise our discretion and reject this action.”).
176. See Islamic Republic of Iran, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 489 (“It would be an
understatement to say that this lawsuit would be as burdensome as a total of
hundreds of ordinary lawsuits.”); Islamic Republic of Iran, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 802
(describing the potential costs of litigation to the taxpayers and courts of New
York).
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advantage: A U.S. court would be expected, following ordinary
choice-of-law analysis, to apply the law of the state where the
harm occurred. 177 (The plaintiffs may of course seek certain
procedural advantages associated with litigation in U.S. courts,
such as more extensive discovery of evidence.) Some of the claims,
however, seek application of U.S. regulatory law. Because no
foreign court would apply such law, 178 the foreign government
plaintiffs may have initiated litigation in the United States
precisely in order to access particular substantive rights.
An initial observation to draw from these case studies, then,
is simply that the foreign-relations consequences of U.S. judicial
engagement in the global arena resist easy generalization. The
sections below explore two further implications of this form of
litigation for debates over the transnational engagement of U.S.
courts.
1. Cooperative Unilateralism?
One theme of the traditional foreign relations narrative
regarding the role of domestic courts is that private enforcement
strategies are not complementary to multilateral strategies, but
are rather in opposition to them. This attitude is reflected
particularly clearly in the context of the revenue rule. One of the
justifications offered in defense of that doctrine is that by
refusing to assist foreign sovereigns in enforcing their own laws,
U.S. courts encourage them to negotiate multilateral solutions to
cross-border regulatory challenges. 179 This argument sees private
177. See Government of the Dominican Republic v. AES Corp., 466 F. Supp.
2d 680, 693–94 (E.D. Va. 2006) (finding that, under Virginia choice-of-law
principles, the law of the Dominican Republic applied because the coal ash was
dumped in the Dominican Republic). Similarly, in the Bhopal litigation, the
court assumed—as is consistent with choice-of-law principles—that the tort
claims would be decided under the laws of India, where the accident occurred.
See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India, 809 F.2d
195, 201 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[P]laintiffs have conceded that in view of India’s strong
interests and its greater contacts with the plant, its operations, its employees,
and the victims of the accident, the law of India, as the place where the tort
occurred, will undoubtedly govern.”).
178. In general, the courts of one country will not apply the public
regulatory law of another. See generally supra note 111 and accompanying text.
179. See William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARV. INT’L
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enforcement as a purely unilateral form of regulation,
undermining other forms of transnational governance that
sovereign states have jointly designed. It has found more general
expression across substantive contexts. Many commentators have
argued that negotiated multilateral solutions to global problems
are preferable to unilateral regulation by individual countries,
including in the form of private enforcement, because they build
on the mutual consent of the states involved. 180
What several of the claims initiated by foreign governments
reveal, however, is that the private enforcement of regulatory law
can be viewed as compatible with multilateral governance
efforts. 181 Consider, for example, an argument made by Honduras
in its RICO claim against the tobacco manufacturers:
Treaties and agreements between Honduras and the United
States call for cooperation between the United States and
Honduras with respect to government efforts to combat
transnational crime and customs fraud. Those treaties and
agreements also confirm that the United States and Honduras
have a joint and unified interest in and objective in assuring
the accurate assessment and collection of customs duties and
other fees and charges. The United States and Honduras have
determined that smuggling operations in breach of their
respective agreements and understandings are harmful to the
L.J. 161, 234–35 (2002) (setting out the argument that withholding such
assistance “encourage[s] non-cooperating countries to come to the bargaining
table,” fostering a higher level of mutual enforcement).
180. See, e.g., Donald I. Baker, Extraterritoriality and the Rule of Law: Why
Friendly Foreign Democracies Oppose Novel, Expansive U.S. Jurisdiction
Claims by Non-Resident Aliens Under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 MD. J. INT’L L.
42, 64 (2013) (arguing that, in the context of human rights litigation, “the
United States ought to be looking more to multilateral cooperation” than to
unilateral private enforcement); Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International
Law from Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. REV. 815, 874 (2009) (arguing that
international law governed by consent-based rules “leads to political legitimacy
and meaningful enforcement” but that “[g]lobal governance based on
extraterritorial domestic laws is an unsustainable and unstable system” to
address international challenges); Alfred P. Rubin, Can the United States Police
the World?, 13 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 371, 374 (1989) (“Our actions would be
more effective if aimed at achieving international cooperation in ways consistent
with the international legal order instead of simply asserting wider American
prescriptive, adjudicatory, and enforcement jurisdiction.”).
181. The following analysis of the filings in the tobacco cases draws in part
on Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT’L L.
251, 267–68 (2006).
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economic, fiscal and commercial interests of both countries,
and, accordingly, it is to their mutual benefit to eliminate and
remedy the effects of such operations. 182

At its core, this is an argument about the regulatory gaps in
the international system and the possibility that litigation in
domestic courts, under domestic law, can fill them. The European
Community’s brief in its initial tobacco lawsuit before the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit presented this argument
particularly clearly. 183 It argued that the application of the
revenue rule would undermine RICO’s purpose, and explicitly
discussed the role of civil actions in U.S. courts as one of a larger
set of transnational enforcement strategies:
RICO’s object is “not merely to compensate victims but to turn
them into prosecutors, ‘private attorneys general,’ dedicated to
eliminating racketeering activity.” With scarce prosecutorial
resources in the U.S. largely committed to the war on
terrorism, the “private attorneys general” here are the ones
motivated and able to pursue transnational organized crime
directed against foreign allies. 184

In support of this suggestion, the brief cited at length the
legislative history of the Patriot Act, including a statement
assuring that “our allies will have access to our courts and the
use of our laws if they are the victims of smuggling, fraud, money
laundering, or terrorism.” 185 The brief concluded that “only the
U.S. courts are situated, equipped, and empowered to enjoin” the
conduct in question. 186

182. First Amended Complaint ¶ 7, Republic of Honduras v. Philip Morris
Int’l, Inc., No. 01-2847-Civ-Moreno/O’Sullivan, 2001 WL 34680245 (S.D. Fla.
Dec. 20, 2001).
183. Brief for Plaintiff–Appellants at 45–46, European Cmty. v. RJR
Nabisco, Inc., 424 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2005) (Nos. 02-7330, 02-7325).
184. Id. (quoting Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 557 (2000)).
185. See id. at 30–32 (citing statement of Senator Kerry); see also id. at 43
(citing a related statement that “[s]ince some of the money-laundering in the
world today also defrauds foreign governments, it would be hostile to the intent
of [the Patriot Act] . . . [to] limit our foreign allies access to our courts to battle
against money laundering”).
186. See id. at 9 (contending that the case involved schemes that constituted
continuing threats “beyond the practical reach of an injunction of any court in
the European Community or the Republic of Colombia”).
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Other claims alleging money laundering also refer explicitly
to the intentionally transnational focus of the regulatory law. In
the Colombian case against liquor manufacturers, for instance,
the court noted that “Congress’s enactment of a private RICO
cause of action predicated on international money laundering
evinces a determination that federal courts should hear such
claims, which will almost universally involve evidence located
abroad.” 187 In these cases, then, foreign sovereigns consent to
regulation under U.S. law, in the form of private enforcement in
U.S. courts—suggesting the intriguing possibility of a sort of
cooperative unilateralism. 188
2. Access to Justice
The arguments made by various governments seeking access
to U.S. courts reveal profound and persistent disparities among
countries in the level of resources available to regulate economic
activity. When developed countries invite U.S. courts to engage in
matters closely tied to their own jurisdictions—as in the
European Community’s case against tobacco companies—they do
so not in order to fill a gap in their own regulatory systems, but to
address conduct that falls into the transnational space. Many of
the claims by developing countries, in contrast, suggest the need
to supplement local resources in various ways. 189
Of course, such resource deficiencies cannot be laid at the
doorstep of the United States, or indeed of any individual legal
system, and the most direct efforts to steer litigation toward the
United States have often met justified skepticism. 190 U.S. courts
187. See Republic of Colombia v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 531 F. Supp. 2d 365,
411 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (rejecting a motion to dismiss RICO claims on the basis of
forum non conveniens).
188. Thanks to Harlan Cohen for suggesting this label for the phenomenon.
189. See supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text (foreshadowing the
various reasons that developing nations bring claims in U.S. courts, including
the inability of those harmed to obtain compensatory relief in their own
countries).
190. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation and
Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1092–94 (2010) (discussing statutes
adopted by a number of Latin American countries in order to deter dismissals on
the basis of forum non conveniens, and the reaction of U.S. courts to those
statutes).
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often apply the revenue rule or the doctrine of forum non
conveniens to block such claims, despite the fact that the
sovereign in question has consented to their jurisdiction. 191 In the
Bhopal litigation, for instance, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York assessed this sort of capacity
argument and concluded that India provided an adequate
alternative forum, despite the concerns voiced by the government
itself:
Plaintiffs, including the Union of India, have argued that the
courts of India are not up to the task of conducting the Bhopal
litigation. They assert that the Indian judiciary has yet to
reach full maturity due to the restraints placed upon it by
British colonial rulers who shaped the Indian legal system to
meet their own ends. Plaintiffs allege that the Indian justice
system has not yet cast off the burden of colonialism to meet
the emerging needs of a democratic people.
The Court thus finds itself faced with a paradox. In the Court’s
view, to retain the litigation in this forum, as plaintiffs
request, would be yet another example of imperialism, another
situation in which an established sovereign inflicted its rules,
its standards and values on a developing nation. This Court
declines to play such a role. The Union of India is a world
power in 1986, and its courts have the proven capacity to mete
out fair and equal justice. To deprive the Indian judiciary of
this opportunity to stand tall before the world and to pass
judgment on behalf of its own people would be to revive a
history of subservience and subjugation from which India has
emerged. India and its people can and must vindicate their
claims before the independent and legitimate judiciary created
there since the Independence of 1947. 192

Some courts have gone even further. In the cases brought by
Iran against the former Shah and his sister, for example, the
lower courts concluded that no alternative forum existed because
of the political situation in Iran. 193 Nevertheless—although the
191. See id. at 1088–89 (“Although foreign plaintiffs desire—and expect—to
be able to sue U.S. defendants in U.S. courts, the courts themselves are
increasingly resisting such suits and limiting foreign plaintiffs’ access to the
federal courts.”).
192. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India, 634 F.
Supp. 842, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
193. See Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 467 N.E.2d 245, 248 (N.Y. 1984)
(“[T]he trial court and the Appellate Division considered all of the relevant
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doctrine of forum non conveniens has generally been interpreted
to require the availability of an adequate alternative forum as a
condition of dismissal 194—the courts concluded that dismissal
was appropriate. 195 Their analysis on this point reflects a decided
unwillingness to have local resources drained by the very
government whose courts had been deemed inadequate:
For almost any other plaintiff, [the unavailability of an
alternative forum] would be a sound and fair reason for
bringing a suit outside Iran. But this plaintiff is the Islamic
Republic of Iran—the Government of Iran. It is a fundamental
obligation of every civilized government to provide a system of
impartial courts which can fairly adjudicate disputes involving
its citizens. As plaintiff is the Government of Iran, that is
plaintiff’s own obligation. And if this plaintiff has failed in that
fundamental obligation, we do not see why the citizens,
taxpayers and courts of this state should be subjected to the
enormous burden of this lawsuit at the behest of the
government which has failed to meet this fundamental
obligation. 196

If the individual claimants whose interests are represented
in such litigation cannot in fact obtain relief elsewhere, then the
decision not to provide this form of judicial assistance may, in
some circumstances, have broader implications for global
governance. As some scholars argue, the result in cases against
corporate defendants may simply be to shield businesses from
factors, including the fact that there may be no alternative forum in which this
claim can be tried because of the political situation in Iran under the Khomeini
regime.”).
194. See id. at 253 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the conclusion of the
majority is inconsistent with the prevailing view that “an alternative forum is
not merely a factor in analysis, but rather an essential prerequisite to
application of forum non conveniens” (quotation omitted)).
195. See Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 464 N.Y.S.2d 487, 488 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1983) (affirming the lower court’s decision, which granted the
defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of forum non
conveniens).
196. Id. at 490; see also Ann Woolhandler, Treaties, Self-Execution, and the
Public Law Litigation Model, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 757, 786–87 (2002)
(characterizing such cases as arising “due to the [plaintiff] government’s own
failure to address through legislation the problem it now seeks to address by
litigation” in which the plaintiffs seek “to escape deficiencies of [their] own
regulatory and remedial systems by using American substantive and procedural
standards”).
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liability for the harm their operations cause in foreign
countries. 197

*

*

*

The final Part of this Article turns to one particular issue:
the extraterritorial application of U.S. regulatory law. It
examines the way in which the traditional paradigm has shaped
recent developments in that area and uses the insights outlined
above to challenge this direction.
IV. “Judicial Imperialism” and the Problem of Extraterritoriality
By accepting jurisdiction over foreign suits that can be
appropriately handled locally, the federal courts embroil the
nation in a kind of judicial “imperialism” that suggests the
United States does not respect or recognize a foreign
government’s ability to administer justice. 198
What the majority has unintentionally accomplished in
embracing this case is nothing less than the wholesale creation
of a World Court, an international tribunal with breathtaking
and limitless jurisdiction to entertain the World’s failures, no
matter where they happen, when they happen, to whom they
happen, the identity of the wrongdoer, and the sovereignty of
one of the parties. 199

A. The Emergence of Concerns Regarding Imperialism
The exercise of jurisdiction—whether judicial, legislative, or
enforcement 200—constitutes an assertion of sovereignty.
Therefore, the adjudication of a case with cross-border elements
by a court in one state necessarily creates potential conflicts of
authority between that state and other affected states (for
197. See, e.g., Dante Figueroa, Are There Ways out of the Current Forum Non
Conveniens Impasse Between the United States and Latin America?, 1 BUS. L.
BRIEF (AM. U.) 42, 42 (2005) (setting forth this argument).
198. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1239–40 (9th Cir. 2007).
199. Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 568–69 (9th Cir. 2005) (Trott,
J., dissenting in part).
200. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 401 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (classifying jurisdiction into these
categories).
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instance, the defendant’s home state, or the state in which
relevant conduct occurred). 201 That potential is particularly great
when the claims in question call for the court to apply local
regulatory law to transactions or conduct occurring in other
countries, in which case the conflicts may involve not only
procedural differences but also differences in applicable
substantive norms. 202
For these reasons, the adjudication of claims arising out of
cross-border economic activity has long raised concerns regarding
interference with sovereign authority. In the area of antitrust
regulation, for instance, a series of disputes in the mid-1970s, at
a time when corporations were expanding their international
operations, highlighted the difficulties resulting from overlapping
jurisdiction among multiple countries. 203 However, those concerns
were raised in the context of economic activity that touched the
forum state along with other countries. 204 In that context, the
question was whether the nexus of the case with the forum
state—and the forum state’s interest in regulating the relevant
activity—were strong enough, in light of the competing interests
of other countries, to justify the assertion of jurisdiction. 205
Growing concern about the potential for infringing on the
sovereignty of other states was simply a result of the increase in
cross-border litigation accompanying globalization.
These concerns were always most salient in the U.S. context
because the particular mix of substantive and procedural law in
the United States facilitated cross-border regulatory litigation.
201. For example, ordering a foreign defendant to procure documentary
evidence located within a foreign country may be viewed as an infringement of
that country’s sovereignty.
202. See generally Buxbaum, supra note 181, at 270 (discussing this
distinction).
203. See LOWENFELD, supra note 7, at 157–66 (describing the difficulty for
U.S. plaintiffs of obtaining discovery against foreign uranium cartel defendants
through British courts).
204. Id. at 158.
205. Id. at 159. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law addressed
this problem by introducing the “jurisdictional rule of reason” as a way to
resolve overlaps of regulatory authority. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 (AM. LAW. INST. 1987)
(determining jurisdiction to be unreasonable if unsupported after consideration
of eight enumerated, but non-exhaustive, factors).
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While other countries also applied their own regulatory laws to
foreign conduct, 206 they did not adopt procedural mechanisms—
such as the class action or broad discovery rules 207—that would
make their courts particularly attractive to plaintiffs. As a result,
most transnational regulatory litigation remained based in the
United States. 208 More critically, U.S. courts began to adjudicate
claims under antitrust and securities regulations with extremely
attenuated connections to the United States. In a number of
these cases, federal courts applied domestic regulatory law to the
claims of foreign plaintiffs, against foreign defendants, for harms
suffered as a result of transactions taking place in foreign
countries. 209 Although some quantum of conduct in these cases
may have occurred within U.S. borders, the U.S. interest in
adjudicating such claims was widely considered insufficient to
justify the interference with foreign regulatory prerogatives. 210
These cases therefore opened U.S. courts to the charge of acting
206. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, International Antitrust and the DOHA Dome,
43 VA. J. INT’L L. 911, 916 (2003) (discussing the adoption of the effects basis for
jurisdiction in other countries).
207. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (governing class action suits in U.S. federal
courts); FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37 (governing discovery in U.S. federal courts).
208. See Baker, supra note 180, at 46 (characterizing the U.S. legal system
as “more favorable to private plaintiffs” than any other foreign system because
of the potential for punitive damages, mandatory jury trials, opt-out class action
suits, and absence of loser-pays fees practice).
209. See, e.g., Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 396 (2d Cir.
2002) (applying U.S. antitrust law to the claims of foreign purchasers in foreign
transactions); In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Secs. Litig., 242 F.R.D. 76, 95–105
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (applying U.S. securities law to the claims of certain foreign
investors for harm resulting from foreign transactions).
210. See, e.g., Brief for the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany
& Belgium as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10, F. Hoffmann–La
Roche Ltd v. Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724) (arguing that
applying U.S. antitrust law to the purchase of vitamins in foreign commerce by
foreign plaintiffs interfered with sovereign interests and “failed to give proper
consideration to the legitimate choices those nations have made concerning the
regulation of their own commerce and competition in their own markets”); see
also Makan Delrahim, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Speech at the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Fall
Forum: Department of Justice Perspectives on International Antitrust
Enforcement: Recent Legal Developments and Policy Implications at 8 (Nov. 18,
2003) (“And the more that the conduct of foreign businesses in foreign countries
becomes subject to the regulatory effect of decisions by United States courts, the
more our antitrust laws risk impinging inappropriately on the economic policies
and sovereignties of foreign countries.”).
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as the “global policeman” in regulatory matters, 211 and gave
additional force to sovereignty concerns.
Perhaps more importantly, U.S. courts began to adjudicate
claims that had no connection with the United States, in the form
of human rights litigation initiated under the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS). 212 By definition, only foreign plaintiffs may avail
themselves of jurisdiction under the ATS, and the first wave of
human rights litigation involved foreign defendants who had
acted outside the United States. 213 The second wave, against
corporate defendants, sometimes involved U.S. corporations; even
in these cases, however, the locus of the relevant conduct was
overseas. 214 Although proponents of ATS litigation supported the
involvement of U.S. courts as a way to improve the enforcement
of international criminal and human rights norms, 215 the mere
fact that domestic courts were adjudicating events with no real
connection to their country generated significant criticism at
home and abroad. Critics pointed to the need to safeguard “the
international legal order’s indispensable functions of facilitating
accommodation and precluding the strong from imposing what
211. See John C. Coffee, Securities Policeman to the World? The Cost of
Global Class Actions, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 18, 2008, at 5 (“While the press and others
attribute the growing disenchantment of foreign issuers with the U.S. market to
Sarbanes–Oxley Act, closer analysis and interview data suggests that fear of
U.S. private antifraud litigation may be the better explanation [for the exit of
foreign companies from U.S. markets].”).
212. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (providing that “[t]he district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States”).
213. See Ernest A. Young, Universal Jurisdiction, the Alien Tort Statute,
and Transnational Public-Law Litigation After Kiobel, 64 DUKE L.J. 1023,
1048–53 (2015) (discussing the paradigmatic cases under the ATS, involving
acts of torture by foreign government officials against their own citizens).
214. See, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 14–16 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(presenting a claim against a U.S. corporation for human rights abuses
occurring in Indonesia); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1258 (11th
Cir. 2009) (addressing a claim against a U.S. corporation arising out of conduct
occurring in Colombia).
215. See Beth Stephens, Translating Filártiga: A Comparative and
International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human
Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 35–39 (2002) (describing this litigation
strategy); Beth Van Schaack, With All Deliberate Speed: Civil Human Rights
Litigation as a Tool for Social Change, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2305, 2308 (2004)
(advocating for the role of U.S. courts in enforcing human rights norms,
ensuring accountability for abuses, and providing redress for victims).
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they unilaterally perceive as justice.” 216 It is in this context that
the critique of judicial interference with foreign sovereignty
gained particular strength, and was frequently framed as a
matter of judicial imperialism. 217
The argument regarding imperialism is simply stated. It
contends that the U.S. has no right—indeed, that no country
has the right—to impose its legal system, or its legal
sensibilities, on any other nation without its consent.
Imperialism is commonly defined, after all, as the domination
by one nation of another against the will of the latter, forcing

216. Brad R. Roth, Coming to Terms with Ruthlessness: Sovereign Equality,
Global Pluralism, and the Limits of International Criminal Justice, 8 SANTA
CLARA J. INT’L L. 231, 237 (2010); see also Anthony Sammons, The
“Under-Theorization” of Universal Jurisdiction: Implications for Legitimacy on
Trials of War Criminals by National Courts, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 111, 125–
41 (2003) (analyzing legitimacy concerns raised when individual nations rely on
universal jurisdiction to act on behalf of the international community in
prosecuting war criminals).
217. See José A. Cabranes, Withholding Judgment: Why U.S. Courts
Shouldn’t Make Foreign Policy, 94 FOREIGN AFF. 125, 126 (2015) (stating that
“the ATS contributed to a perception of American judicial imperialism”);
Schrage, supra note 198, at 154:
A court decision to hear an Alien Tort Statute claim over actions in
South Africa reflects the worst sort of “judicial imperialism.” It would
send the message that the United States does not respect the ability
of South African society to administer justice by implying that U.S.
courts are better placed to judge the pace and degree of South Africa’s
national reconciliation.
Beth Van Schaack, supra note 215, at 2346 (describing the possibility of
resistance to ATS litigation as “a form of judicial imperialism or
neocolonialism”); Herbert R. Reginbogin, Litigating Genocide of the Past, 32
LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 83, 88 (2010) (asserting that the defendant
states and their publics in Holocaust-era litigation “resented the idea that U.S.
courts could call others to account for their role during World War II in the form
of a lex Americana or even judicial imperialism by using political and economic
power to exercise its influence”); Laura Richardson Brownlee, Note,
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the United States: American Attitudes and
Practices in the Prosecution of Charles “Chuckie” Taylor Jr., 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL
STUD. L. REV. 331, 349 (2010) (“The breach of state sovereignty represented by
the use of extraterritorial jurisdiction can also give rise to claims of judicial
imperialism.”). For a similar argument in the area of environmental protection,
see Seth A. Northrop, Exporting Environmental Justice by Importing Claimants:
The Suitability and Feasibility of the Globalization of Mass Tort Class Actions,
18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 779, 783 (2006) (“Perhaps the most notable
objection to an expanded extraterritorial reach of Rule 23 [in environmental
cases] is that such an expansion may amount to judicial imperialism.”).
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it to subordinate itself to the dominant power’s economic,
cultural, and/or political values. 218

B. The Ascendance of the Imperialism Narrative
The narrative in which U.S. courts interfere with the
authority of foreign sovereigns has been used by many
constituencies involved in transnational litigation. It provides a
useful tool for litigants, who deploy that narrative to frame their
objections to U.S. jurisdiction of various kinds. 219 It gives the
media a backdrop against which to describe forms of
cross-border litigation. 220 Industry groups promoting the
218. Steven M. Schneebaum, What Is This Case Doing Here? Human Rights
Litigation in the Courts of the United States, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 183, 189
(2011).
219. See, e.g., Novartis AG’s Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support
of its Motion to Dismiss at 13, In re Alcon Shareholder Litig., 719 F. Supp. 2d
263 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No 10-cv-139)
Tellingly, plaintiffs have cited no authority remotely supporting the
proposition that . . . a dispute about the meaning of [a foreign
corporation’s internal] governance documents is transformed into a
claim arising under U.S. law. Indeed, if that were the case, any
American shareholder of a foreign corporation filing 20-Fs could force
the application of U.S. law to matters of internal corporate
governance—a result that would deprive the internal affairs doctrine
of all force. . . . This would also risk the very type of “legal
imperialism” the U.S. Supreme Court has warned against in other
contexts.
See also Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to
Dismiss Plainitiffs’ § 14 Claim at 25, E.ON AG v. Acciona, S.A., 468 F. Supp. 2d
559 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 060-civ-8720)
This is precisely the type of case in which the U.S. interest in a
domestic forum carries little weight. The dispute is entirely
European. Spain and Europe “have their own sophisticated
regulatory structure for takeovers,” and U.S. adjudication of the
dispute would effectively strip Spanish regulators of authority over a
local transaction, in violation of principles of international comity.
Coffee Decl. ¶¶ 4–5, 32 (noting “European resentment at U.S. ‘legal
imperialism’—the seeming insistence by the U.S. that its rules should take
priority and control, even when its association with a predominantly foreign
transaction is only peripheral”).
220. See, e.g., Editorial: Old Law, New Questions, WASH. POST, July 20,
2004, at A16 (noting a “flood of litigation . . . over conduct that, however
horrible, is not obviously the province of America’s courts to redress”); Human
Rights in Court, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2004, at A21 (describing a “raft of litigation
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interests of corporate defendants also situate their arguments
within this paradigm. 221
In addition, the scholarship on transnational litigation
frequently expresses concerns regarding foreign sovereignty—
and, increasingly, imperialism. Importantly, the narrative
appeals to commentators across the ideological spectrum.
Scholars including Professor Mattei and Professor Krisch, for
example, refer to the concept of imperialism to express concerns
about the hegemonic motives or effects of imposing particular
norms through domestic action. 222 In this sense, the narrative is
used to challenge the legitimacy of various efforts either to create
supranational adjudication mechanisms or to deploy national
tribunals in the service of global regulatory goals. 223 Others, by
contrast, invoke concerns regarding infringement on foreign
over wrongs [that] America’s courts have no practical power to address”).
221. See generally GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS,
AWAKENING MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789 45–48 (2003) (using the
label “judicial imperialism” to describe the effect of Alien Tort Statute litigation
on corporate interests); see also Jide Nzelibe, Contesting Adjudication: The
Partisan Divide over Alien Tort Statute Litigation, 33 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 475,
510–11 (2013) (describing the mobilization of business interests, like those
represented by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, against ATS litigation);
Francisco Rivera, A Response to the Corporate Campaign Against the Alien Tort
Claims Act, 14 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 251, 255–59 (2003) (identifying
various groups coalescing around criticism of the Alien Tort Statute as an
overextension of U.S. jurisdiction).
222. Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power
and the Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 369, 400–
04 (2005) (discussing extraterritorial jurisdiction within the larger context of
domestic law as “an instrument of international dominance”); Ugo Mattei &
Jeffrey Lena, U.S. Jurisdiction over Conflicts Arising Outside of the United
States: Some Hegemonic Implications, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 381,
382–83 (2001) (suggesting that “the expansionist thrust of the jurisdiction of
U.S. courts over [claims arising out of the Holocaust] may be viewed as a sort of
legal imperialism in which the United States . . . asserts itself upon the rest of
the world”).
223. For this critique in the context of transjudicialism, see, for example,
Mark Toufayan, Identity, Effectiveness, and Newness in Transjudicialism’s
Coming of Age, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 307, 381 (2010) (critiquing the account of
transjudicialism as promoting more effective tribunals for the enforcement of
human rights, noting “Third World concerns about a resurgence of
neo-colonialist and imperial motives in transjudicialism”); see also Okechukwu
Oko, The Challenges of International Criminal Prosecutions in Africa, 31
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 343, 354 (2008) (discussing the view that international
criminal tribunals are “agents and symptoms of imperialism, and [represent]
attempts by the West to reestablish its sovereignty over Africa”).
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sovereignty to argue for constraints on the activity of the U.S.
judiciary as a constitutional matter. Professor Bradley, for
instance, has argued that “judicial activism” in extraterritoriality
cases can exceed the constitutional authority of the courts. 224
Similarly, Professor Stephan refers to the “resistance of foreign
states to the ambitions of U.S. civil litigation” 225 in arguing that
“expressive internationalism” as practiced by courts has different,
and more deleterious, consequences than the same approach as
practiced by the political branches. 226 At the outer edge of this
argument, the narrative resonates with those who use the idea of
judicial imperialism to attack perceived excesses of judicial power
more generally. 227 Perhaps the most visible recent example of this
context is the debate following the Supreme Court’s decision in
Boumediene v. Bush, 228 which many commentators analyzed as
an act of imperialism in an ongoing power struggle between the
judiciary and the executive. 229
224. See Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age
of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505, 550–51 (1997) (arguing that separation of
powers concerns support the presumption against extraterritoriality); see also
Schrage, supra note 198, at 154 (describing court rulings in cases challenging
global business practices as “judicial intervention [that] threatens to undermine
the authority of the President to set U.S. foreign policy with the advice and
consent of Congress”); Woolhandler, supra note 196, at 781–85 (arguing against
extending the “public law litigation model” to the international sphere).
225. Paul B. Stephan, A Becoming Modesty—U.S. Litigation in the Mirror of
International Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 655 (2002).
226. See id. at 660–61 (concluding that the arguments against “expressive
internationalism” do not apply to the political branches).
227. See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The
Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 544 (1997) (“The history of judicial
review in this country, told in broad brush strokes, is one of creeping judicial
imperialism.”); ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF
JUDGES 2, 22–38 (2003) (bemoaning the “recent ascendancy almost everywhere
of activist, ambitious, and imperialistic judiciaries,” and using human rights
litigation as an example of that trend).
228. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
229. See
Martin
J.
Katz,
Guantanamo,
Boumediene,
and
Jurisdiction-Stripping: The Imperial President Meets the Imperial Court, 25
CONST. COMMENT. 377, 378 (2009) (arguing that the Court’s “forceful view of
judicial power” in Boumediene straddles the fence between a balanced
separation of powers and “an exercise in judicial imperialism”); John Yoo, The
Supreme Court Goes to War, WALL STREET J. (June 17, 2008, 12:01 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121366596327979497 (last visited Jan. 21, 2016)
(characterizing the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush as “judicial
imperialism of the highest order,” and stating that “[t]he Boumediene
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The narrative is of course most compelling when foreign
sovereigns themselves use it—and they have done so frequently.
In ATS cases, many governments file amicus briefs raising
sovereignty concerns. 230 In Kiobel, for instance, the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom submitted a brief criticizing “the efforts
of U.S. litigators and judges to bypass the legal systems of other
sovereigns by deciding civil cases involving foreign parties where
there is no significant nexus to the United States.” 231 Foreign
governments have also expressed imperialism concerns in
diplomatic and other interventions connected with such litigation.
In a case arising out of the apartheid-era activities of
corporations active in South Africa, for example, the South
African government intervened to argue that litigation in the
United States would interfere with its own efforts to address the
consequences of apartheid. 232
It is not only the human rights cases that are framed in this
way, however. Foreign governments also invoke these concerns in
litigation addressing the geographic reach of various regulatory
laws. 233 In a recent securities fraud case, for example, the United
majority . . . assumes that we have accepted judicial control over virtually every
important policy in our society, from abortion and affirmative action to religion”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jules Lobel, The Supreme
Court and Enemy Combatants, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1131, 1134–38 (2008)
(discussing “judicial supremacy theory” in the context of separation of powers).
230. See, e.g., Brief for the Governments of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae
Supporting Neither Party at 24, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct.
1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491); see also infra notes 231–244 and accompanying text
(reviewing the arguments of various foreign sovereigns’ briefs).
231. Brief for the Governments of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae
Supporting Neither Party at 24, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491); see also
Kristen E. Eichensehr, Foreign Sovereigns as Friends of the Court, 102 VA. L.
REV. 289 (2016) (studying amicus briefs filed by foreign sovereigns in the
Supreme Court). It is important to note that there are some counter-examples.
In Kiobel, for instance, the Republic of Argentina filed an amicus brief arguing
in favor of U.S jurisdiction. Brief for the Government of the Argentine Republic
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 3–4, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No.
10-1491) (arguing for universal jurisdiction under the ATS over the limited
categories of norms recognized in Filartiga and Sosa).
232. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 258–59 (2d
Cir. 2007) (describing the ex parte declaration of interference by the South
African government).
233. See Baker, supra note 180, at 46 (“[F]oreign governments have filed
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Kingdom filed an amicus brief referencing imperialism concerns
in arguing against the extraterritorial application of U.S. law. 234
As a result, the narrative is now used to describe the engagement
of U.S. courts not only in cases lacking a meaningful nexus with
the United States, but also in cases involving various forms of
corporate activity that implicate both local and foreign regulatory
interests.
Most consequentially, the imperialism narrative has come to
anchor the judicial response in transnational cases. 235 Again,
these cases range from human rights litigation to claims arising
out of ordinary economic activity. In one ATS case before the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, for example, the
concurring opinion stated:
I cannot think that there is some consensus among nations
that American courts and lawyers have the power to bring to
court transnational corporations of other countries, to inquire
into their operations in third countries, to regulate them . . . .
Is it plausible that customary international law supports
proceedings that would harm other civilized nations and be
opposed by them—or be tantamount to “judicial
imperialism?” 236

Similarly, a number of antitrust cases, including recent litigation
in the Southern District of New York involving alleged rate-fixing
in the foreign exchange market, refer to legal imperialism in
considering the scope of U.S. antitrust law. 237
numerous amicus briefs over the years, urging the U.S. appellate courts to curb
what they regard as ‘judicial imperialism’ by U.S. courts in private civil cases
under other federal statutes.”).
234. Brief for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants–Appellees and Affirmance at 18, City
of Pontiac Policemen’s & Firemen’s Ret. Sys. v. UBS AG, 752 F.3d 173 (2d Cir.
2014) (No. 12-4355) (quoting from Justice Breyer’s opinion in Hoffmann–
LaRoche criticizing the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law).
235. See Baker, supra note 180, at 46 (noting that the arguments raised by
foreign governments have influenced the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence).
236. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 268, 270 (2d Cir. 2011)
(Jacobs, C.J., concurring in denial of rehearing), denial of rehearing aff’d en
banc, 642 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 2011); see also Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d
1193, 1239–40 (9th Cir. 2007) (arguing for local exhaustion prior to accepting
jurisdiction over foreign suits).
237. See In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litig., 74 F. Supp.
3d 581, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding that under “principles of comity” claims for
conduct outside of the United States fall outside the scope of the Sherman Act).
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The danger is that this narrative can function as a heuristic
that courts use to minimize the complexities inherent in
transnational litigation. Viewing cross-border cases through this
lens, courts may fail to account sufficiently for U.S. interests that
are present even in cases closely tied to other countries. As a
result, they may turn too readily to doctrines such as forum non
conveniens 238 and the presumption against extraterritoriality in
order to dismiss transnational claims. 239
Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence in the area of
legislative jurisdiction, explored in the following section, reflects
such an effect.
C. The Supreme Court on Legislative Jurisdiction
In a series of cases over the past decade, the Supreme Court
has addressed the geographic scope of various U.S. laws. The
immediate question such cases present is not whether the courts
have the authority to adjudicate transnational disputes: it is
whether Congress, when enacting a particular statute, intended
it to apply to conduct or persons outside of the United States. 240
In each of these cases, however, the Court considered the scope of
the relevant statute in the context of private litigation. The
particular conflicts created by judicial engagement in
cross-border regulation were therefore central to the Court’s
analysis.
F. Hoffmann–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 241 decided in
2004, addressed the application of U.S. antitrust law to claims
brought by foreign plaintiffs who had purchased price-fixed goods
238. See generally Richard D. Bernstein, James C. Dugan & Lindsay M.
Addison, Closing Time: You Don’t Have to Go Home, but You Can’t Stay Here, 67
BUS. LAW. 957, 957–76 (2012) (analyzing the growing tendency of U.S. courts to
reject claims involving foreign plaintiffs or foreign conduct, including on the
basis of forum non conveniens).
239. See Pamela Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081,
1085 (2015) (describing this tendency to dismiss transnational claims as
“litigation isolationism”).
240. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES § 401 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (distinguishing legislative and
judicial jurisdiction).
241. 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
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in foreign transactions. 242 The Court considered the problem of
legislative conflict in general, noting that the application of U.S.
law in a cross-border setting “creates a serious risk of
interference with a foreign nation’s ability independently to
regulate its own commercial affairs.” 243 It specifically noted
foreign hostility to the treble damages remedy available in
private actions, citing amicus briefs filed by Canada, Germany,
and Japan. 244 Those briefs had emphasized the “especially
intrusive” effect on foreign interests of private enforcement
mechanisms 245 and the risk that “United States courts [would
become] the forum of choice without regard to whose laws are
applied, where the injuries occurred, or even if there is any
connection to the court except the ability to get in personam
jurisdiction over the defendants.” 246 The Court held that the
Sherman Act did not apply to claims arising out of foreign
transactions, to the extent those transactions gave rise only to
foreign harm. 247
A later decision, Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 248
addressed the same question in the context of securities
242. See id. at 159 (summarizing the complaint of plaintiffs alleging a
conspiracy among vitamin manufacturers and distributors that resulted in
higher priced vitamins in the United States as well as foreign countries).
243. Id. at 165.
244. See id. at 167–68 (“And several foreign nations have filed briefs here
arguing that to apply our remedies would unjustifiably permit their citizens to
bypass their own less generous remedial schemes, thereby upsetting a balance
of competing considerations that their own domestic antitrust laws embody.”).
245. See, e.g., Brief of the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany
and Belgium as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 15, Hoffmann–La
Roche, 542 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724) (arguing that the claims of private plaintiffs
were especially intrusive, particularly as compared to actions brought by the
U.S. government, which amici characterized as restrained and “sensitiv[e] to the
concerns of foreign governments”).
246. Brief of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
Ireland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 13, Hoffmann–La Roche, 542 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724). These
objections were prominent during oral argument as well, where the discussion
turned to whether U.S. courts were “world courts,” equipped to entertain the
private claims of foreign plaintiffs. Transcript of Oral Argument at 15,
Hoffmann–La Roche, 542 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724).
247. See F. Hoffmann–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 162
(2004) (finding that when adverse foreign effect is independent of adverse
domestic effect, as in the case at bar, U.S. antitrust law does not apply).
248. 561 U.S. 247 (2010).

FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AS PLAINTIFFS

711

regulation. Morrison involved a so-called “foreign cubed” claim: A
foreign investor sued a foreign issuer for harm suffered in
connection with a foreign investment transaction. 249 Some of the
defendant’s conduct had occurred within the United States,
presenting the question whether that conduct was sufficient to
trigger the application of U.S. anti-fraud provisions. 250 Again, the
Court emphasized the particular context of judicial
enforcement. 251 At oral argument, several justices mentioned
concerns regarding the role of U.S. courts. In one exchange with
the plaintiffs’ counsel, for example, Justice Scalia stated:
[B]ut Australia says: Look, it’s up to us to decide whether
there has been a misrepresentation, . . . and whether it’s been
relied upon . . . . And we should be able to decide that and we
don’t want it decided by a foreign court. . . . [I]t ought to be up
to us to decide that issue; and here you are dragging the
American courts into it. 252

These concerns were echoed in a number of amicus filings from
foreign governments (as well as foreign business groups)
protesting the involvement of U.S. courts. 253 The Court ultimately
concluded that § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act applied
only to claims arising out of transactions occurring within the
United States, and not to those arising out of foreign
transactions. 254 In so holding, it referenced the “fear that [the
249. Id. at 250–51.
250. Id. at 266.
251. Id. at 260.
252. Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Morrison, 561 U.S. 247 (No. 08–
1191); see also id. at 42 (stating argument by the defendant’s counsel that to
apply U.S. law “would amount to exactly the soft [sic] of legal imperialism that
this Court rejected, rightly, in Empagran”).
253. See Brief of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia as
Amicus Curiae in Support of the Defendants–Appellees at 4, Morrison, 561 U.S.
247 (No. 08-1191) (“The present case is one of many in which foreign plaintiffs
seek to bring essentially foreign disputes before U.S. courts in order to be able to
utilize procedures and rules that tend to favor plaintiffs.”).
254. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 273 (2010). This
holding restricts the scope of § 10(b) not only in the judicial context but in the
public enforcement context as well—a result that Congress reversed in
subsequent legislation. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77v (2012)) (restoring the authority of public regulators to apply Section 10(b)
extraterritorially in Section 929P(b)). In this context, then, concerns over
judicial overreaching affected perceptions regarding the role of U.S. law in
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United States] has become the Shangri-La of class-action
litigation for lawyers representing those allegedly cheated in
foreign securities markets.” 255
Most recently, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 256 the
Court addressed the extraterritorial reach of the Alien Tort
Statute. Although that statute is not conduct-regulating but
merely jurisdictional, the Court decided that the concerns
animating the presumption against extraterritoriality were
present in that context as well. 257 It noted that foreign policy
considerations might in fact be more significant with respect to
ATS claims than in other substantive contexts, because “the
question is not what Congress had done but instead what courts
may do.” 258 In this case too, many amicus briefs filed with the
Court emphasized the principle of non-interference with the right
to self-governance of other sovereigns. The Court held that there
was no clear indication that Congress had intended to create
jurisdiction over claims based on conduct occurring in the
territory of other countries, thereby foreclosing claims that did
not “touch and concern the territory of the United States . . . with
sufficient force to displace the presumption against
extraterritoriality.” 259
D. Critique
One of the central assumptions of the imperialism narrative
is that the application of U.S. regulatory law to foreign conduct—
particularly in the context of private enforcement, with all of its
related incidents such as treble damages—interferes with foreign
sovereignty. Foreign governments themselves have often made
such arguments as amicus curiae in litigation involving their

transnational regulation more broadly.
255. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 270.
256. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
257. See id. at 1664 (“It is true that Congress, even in a jurisdictional
provision, can indicate that it intends federal law to apply to conduct occurring
abroad.”).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 1669.
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citizens. 260 They have frequently argued that international law
precludes U.S. courts from applying domestic regulatory law to
cases with significant foreign elements, as doing so would violate
the sovereignty of other affected states. 261
At one level, the case studies discussed in Part III may be
read simply to undermine the strength of these objections. And,
indeed, some elements of the complaints filed by foreign
governments are difficult to square with the rather categorical
assertions they have sometimes made in amicus filings. Many
European countries, for instance, have in amicus briefs
emphasized the incompatibility of U.S.-style private enforcement
procedures with the values of their own justice systems. 262 In the
tobacco litigation initiated by the European Community,
however, they seek treble damages 263—one of the most frequently
criticized incidents of U.S.-style private enforcement.
More fundamentally, the analysis of litigation initiated by
foreign governments in the United States demonstrates that the
concept of “judicial imperialism” fails to capture the ways in
which the extraterritorial application of U.S. law may fit
comfortably with global governance strategies. In some of the
260. In Empagran, for example, Belgium and Germany jointly filed an
amicus brief in which they made this point. See Brief for the Governments of the
Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 10, F. Hoffmann–La Roche Ltd v. Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155
(2004) (No. 03-724)
The most important factors—primacy over a given transaction, the
locus of the conduct, the locus of that conduct’s effects, and the
strength of the foreign state’s policies that bear on the problem—all
point to countries other than the United States as the proper forum
for these disputes.
261. See Baker, supra note 180, at 50–51 (using the U.K.–Netherlands
amicus brief in Kiobel to outline the “longstanding story of foreign government
dissatisfaction with private U.S. litigation brought against foreign nationals for
offshore conduct”).
262. See, e.g., Brief of the Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Japan, the Swiss Confederation, and the
Kingdom of the Netherlands as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants–
Appellees at 14–15, Empagran v. F. Hoffmann–La Roche Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267
(2005) (No. 01-7115) (arguing that expansive application of U.S. antitrust law
would override “deliberate policy decisions [of countries including Germany, The
Netherlands, and Switzerland] . . . not to adopt a liberal, jury-based private
treble damages system”).
263. European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 424 F.3d 175, 178 (2d Cir. 2005),
cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 28 (2015).
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cases described above, a foreign government—by filing a claim—
has explicitly consented to the application of U.S. regulatory law
to conduct occurring within its own borders. I do not wish here to
understate the importance of that consent. 264 It is undoubtedly
true that a government that has adopted a comprehensive
antitrust law, and which enforces that law, might view it as an
intrusion on its sovereignty if a foreign court were to apply its
own (and different) law to claims against that government’s
citizens based on harms felt within its borders. 265 Yet that same
government might welcome the application of foreign law—even
to claims against its own citizens, based on harms felt within its
borders—in order to recover for losses caused by a criminal
enterprise. 266 But these claims—and, most importantly, their
characterization of the relationship between the private
enforcement of domestic regulatory law and other modes of
governance—indicate the possibility of a meaningful role for
domestic courts and domestic law in a cooperative regulatory
system. The imperialism narrative underplays that possibility.
Finally, the cases also suggest that the very concept of
“sovereignty,” as it relates to mechanisms of global governance,
may have a different valence in different parts of the world.
General statements that the application of domestic regulatory
law in transnational cases violates the sovereignty of affected
states may fail to capture accurately the interests of developing
countries. 267 The resource arguments those countries make
264. It is not the extraterritorial application of law per se that triggers
sovereignty concerns, or the involvement of a U.S. court in litigation that is
closely connected with another country. It is the extraterritorial application of
law against the will of the foreign sovereign. See Schneebaum, supra note 218,
at 189 (defining imperialism as “domination by one nation of another against
the will of the latter”).
265. See Brief of the Government of Canada as Amici Curiae Supporting
Reversal at 10–15, F. Hoffmann–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155
(2004) (No. 03-724) (arguing that Canada and other nations have a substantial
interest in regulating anticompetitive behavior and that upholding U.S.
jurisdiction would conflict with and impede effective administration of Canada’s
antitrust regime).
266. See Brief for Plaintiff–Appellant at 15–18, Att’y Gen. of Can. v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001) (No. 00-7972)
(seeking the application of RICO, including in a claim against a Canadian
company).
267. In the Kiobel litigation before the Supreme Court, for instance, the
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directly, as plaintiffs, contradict the generalized assertions made
by other countries as amici curiae that comity requires
constraints on the application of domestic regulatory law by U.S.
courts. 268 Moreover, the resource deficiencies discussed in some of
these complaints may also speak in favor of more expansive, not
more restrictive, application of domestic regulatory law. As I and
others have argued, in the case of conduct that affects many
countries simultaneously, a lack of adequate regulation in some
jurisdictions means that the actors may realize a gain from their
conduct, despite paying fines or damages in others. 269 If that is
true, then such conduct will be insufficiently deterred, creating
additional enforcement costs even in the jurisdictions that do
have effective regulation. 270 All countries affected by such
Republic of Argentina filed an amicus brief stating that the application of the
Alien Tort Statute in U.S. court created little risk of undermining the
sovereignty of foreign governments. Brief for the Government of the Argentine
Republic as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 14, Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491). It concluded,
The Alien Tort Statute offers a valuable instrument to promote goals
shared by all democratic republics. Many Alien Tort Statute arising
abroad are brought in contexts where no alternative forum
exists . . . . Loss of the Alien Tort Statute as a tool for human rights
victims seeking justice would be a serious blow to the cause of
democracy and human rights.
Id.
268. Ralf Michaels has made the point that the U.S. Supreme Court, in
particular, may be ignoring a second form of imperialism: Not the kind that
comes from “imposing U.S. law on the rest of the world,” but the kind that comes
from “rejecting access to the courts necessary for protection against Western
corporate actors.” Ralf Michaels, Empagran’s Empire: International Law and
Statutory Interpretation in the U.S. Supreme Court of the Twenty-First Century,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE
533, 546 (David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge eds., 2011).
269. Hannah L. Buxbaum, Class Actions, Conflict and the Global Economy,
21 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 585, 596 (2014); see also Michal S. Gal,
International Antitrust Solutions: Discrete Steps or Causally Linked, in MORE
COMMON GROUND FOR INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW 239, 241–42 (Josef
Drexl et al. eds., 2009) (describing global underdeterrence in the area of
antitrust law); JOHN M. CONNOR, EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF THE SHERMAN ACT AND
DETERRENCE
OF
PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL
CARTELS
3–4
(2004),
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/28686/1/sp04-08.pdf
(arguing
that
jurisdiction in the United States over such cases is necessary to increase global
deterrence to an “acceptable level”).
270. For early recognition of this challenge in a case brought by foreign
governments, see In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 315, 315
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (involving an action brought by the State of Kuwait against
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activity, in other words, have a domestic interest in ensuring
adequate levels of regulation at the global level.
V. Conclusion
Concerns regarding foreign sovereignty occupy a central
place in conversations regarding the role of U.S. courts in the
transnational arena, and rightly so. Even proponents of
expansive judicial participation in global governance, aware of
the conflicting and overlapping authority of different states,
recognize the need to observe the jurisdictional rules that
“allocate among states a competence to take account of the
distribution of value, policy, interest, and power existing in the
world today.” 271 In recent years, however, these concerns have
come to be situated within a particular normative framework: one
within which the activity of domestic courts necessarily interferes
with sovereign regulatory authority. This orientation—
particularly when it is described as “judicial imperialism”—exerts
force in a particular direction: toward constraining the role of
domestic courts in addressing transnational disputes.
This Article’s analysis of litigation initiated in U.S. courts by
foreign sovereigns challenges the presumptions that shape this
framework. By exploring situations in which foreign governments
actively seek the engagement of U.S. courts, it provides a
corporate defendants, which alleged price fixing in the sale of broad spectrum
antibiotics).
A conspiracy among domestic producers of antibiotic drugs to reduce
or eliminate competition as to foreign sales would certainly have an
adverse effect on domestic competition. Not only would it enable the
domestic manufacturers to build up a substantial “war chest” from
excessive profits from foreign sales but such a conspiracy might
prevent either a domestic or a foreign manufacturer from entering
into the foreign market in order to build up its strength to enter into
the restricted domestic market. In an age of expanding world trade, a
truly successful monopoly requires control of both domestic and
foreign markets. For these reasons, this court is convinced that the
fundamental goal of the antitrust laws could be seriously frustrated
by not permitting Kuwait to maintain a treble damage action for
damages resulting from the alleged conspiracy.
Id. at 316–17.
271. RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER 9 (1964).
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counterpoint to the prevailing narrative. Further, it argues that
the notion of “judicial imperialism” is both inaccurate and
unhelpful. First, that construct fails to capture the broader
context of interaction between U.S. courts and foreign
governments, much of which involves the courts as participants
in cooperative governance processes. Second, it elides important
regional differences regarding the effectiveness of enforcement in
the transnational arena. Third, by placing domestic and foreign
interests in opposition to each other, it obscures important shared
and global interests in matters of transnational regulation.
Finally, it creates a false dichotomy between unilateral and
multilateral enforcement efforts in many substantive fields of
law. In all of these ways, the imperialism narrative interferes
with a fair assessment of the judicial role in global governance.

